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1721 
WELFARE AND FEDERALISM’S PERIL 
Andrew Hammond* 
Abstract: Recent scholarship on American federalism lacks case studies to inform that 
scholarship’s trans-substantive insights and claims. This Article examines the last two decades 
of devolution brought about by the 1996 Welfare Reform Act (PRWORA). It details the history 
of PRWORA and how the funding mechanism built into Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF)—the TANF block grant—guaranteed the program’s deterioration. The 
Article documents the program’s failure to respond to increased need among poor families 
after Hurricane Katrina and in the Great Recession, showing how the federal government’s use 
of TANF in both crises teach us the limits of fiscally devolved programs. The Article then 
explores two potential paths forward for TANF as either a devolutionary outlier in social policy 
or as a harbinger of what is to come from recent Congressional proposals to block grant 
Medicaid and SNAP (food stamps). Public interest lawyers rightly fear that TANF could be 
the cutting edge of a newly devolved American safety net. The Article concludes by 
considering what the cautionary tale of TANF means for scholars of federalism and anti-
poverty advocates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
State administration of the American safety net is as old as the safety 
net itself. Established by the Social Security Act of 1935, Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC)1—what people think of as “welfare”—
was always administered by state governments. For sixty years, many 
states made programmatic changes to AFDC in attempts to regulate the 
behavior of recipients. But in 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)2 radically changed the 
nature of federal-state relations in cash assistance. AFDC and its 
cooperative federalist structure gave way to Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families (TANF), a program funded through block grants that drastically 
increased state discretion.3 The federal government devolved the 
allocation of cash assistance resources directly to the states. Nearly two 
decades since PRWORA’s enactment, legal aid lawyers and scholars of 
American federalism can now evaluate how TANF has fared as an 
experiment in devolving basic programmatic design and fiscal 
responsibility to the states. Such reflection is particularly warranted as 
Congress considers whether and how to restructure Medicaid, the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly food 
stamps, and other safety net programs along the same lines of the TANF 
Block Grant. 
The policy results of the TANF block grant are sobering. TANF is less 
                                                     
1. Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397) (establishing “grants to states for aid to dependent children”). 
2. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
3. Id. § 103 (creating TANF block grants in place of AFDC). 
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effective than AFDC at pulling families out of deep poverty.4 Deep 
poverty is increasingly a reality for very young children, and 3 million 
Americans are disconnected from the safety net with no connection to the 
labor market or government services.5 Meanwhile, states are using the 
TANF block grant to plug budget holes, diverting federal funding 
intended for needy families to meet other funding gaps and supplant state 
efforts in other areas. 
Perhaps most telling, TANF no longer responds to economic 
downturns and concomitant increases in poverty.6 In the face of the largest 
economic crisis since the Great Depression, the federal government could 
not use TANF as an automatic stabilizer in the 2009 stimulus package. 
TANF had deteriorated to such an extent that it played only a minor part 
in the national strategy to face the deepest recession in eighty years. 
Moreover, states were so hampered by the revenue shortfalls from the 
recession itself that they could not deploy TANF to provide much-needed 
assistance to needy families. Instead, the federal government turned to 
other safety net programs, created a separate emergency fund for TANF 
families with a radically different funding structure, and created yet 
another waiver process to encourage states to depart from TANF’s 
restrictions.7 Put simply, the federal government’s response to the Great 
Recession unmasked TANF’s deterioration—a deterioration brought 
about by TANF’s devolutionary design. 
This Article argues that the experience of TANF should inform both 
the scholarship on American federalism and anti-poverty advocacy. 
TANF’s demise should dampen the desires of both academics and 
advocates to devolve program design and funding decisions to state 
governments. I develop this argument in four parts. In Part I, I summarize 
recent scholarship on American federalism and explain why case studies 
about specific areas of federal-state policy and programs can inform that 
scholarship’s trans-substantive insights and claims. In Part II, I detail the 
history of PRWORA and how the fiscal federalism built into the 
legislation guaranteed the deterioration of TANF since 1996. In Part III, I 
document the program’s failure to respond to increased need after 
Hurricane Katrina and in the Great Recession and what the federal 
government’s use of TANF in both crises teach us about the law of 
                                                     
4. See DAVID SEITH, FIRST FOCUS, COSTLY CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL IMPACT OF CONGRESS’ 
ELIMINATION OF THE TANF SUPPLEMENTAL GRANTS (2012), https://firstfocus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/FirstFocus-Poverty-CostlyConsequencesTANFSupplementalGrants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z5TR-3R65]. 
5. See id. 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. See infra section III.A. 
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devolved programs. In Part IV, I explain why the degree of discretion in 
program design and financing given to the states in TANF makes the 
program a devolutionary outlier in social policy—contrasting TANF with 
other income support programs like SNAP, the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—and why recent 
Congressional proposals to block grant other public benefits are so wrong-
headed. I conclude by exploring what the cautionary tale of TANF means 
for federalism scholars and anti-poverty lawyers. 
I. THE PROBLEM WITH TRANS-SUBSTANTIVE FEDERALISM 
In Part I, I argue that legal scholarship on federalism should include 
case studies of recent law and policy reform in various substantive areas. 
I suggest one area ripe for inquiry is the American safety net, which 
exhibits various federalism designs. 
A. Federalism Scholarship and the Need for Case Studies 
Federal-state relations have preoccupied the last thirty years of 
American public law. Demands for devolution from the national to state 
governments in the 1980s led to sweeping changes in how states and the 
federal government interact—and how the American polity funds, 
implements, and changes policy. Policymakers have experimented with 
various combinations of federal-state funding and implementation in areas 
as diverse as criminal law,8 environmental law,9 public education,10 and 
health care.11 
The last three decades of changes in federal-state relations has largely 
come at the behest of conservative policymakers and interests,12 but 
                                                     
8. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from 
the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519 (2011); William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1969 (2008). 
9. See generally William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. 
L.J. 108 (2005); Dan C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996). 
10. See generally Thomas Kleven, Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 393 
(2010); Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and 
Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 691, 708 (1994); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, 
The Past, Present, and Future of Equal Educational Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of 
Education Federalism, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 429 (2012). 
11. See generally John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, Leaders and Laggards in State Coverage 
Expansions, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 179 (John Holahan et al. eds., 2003); SHANNA ROSE, 
FINANCING MEDICAID: FEDERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET 
(2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-
Fashioned Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013). 
12. See generally TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION (1998); Ernest A. 
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recently, liberal policymakers and scholars have been advocating for a 
kind of progressive federalism.13 Spurred by gridlock in Washington and 
innovations in states on a host of issues like education reform, 
environmental policy, and civil rights, these new federalists have 
rehabilitated devolutionary design on the left. Indeed, one could have 
characterized many of then-President Obama’s domestic initiatives as 
animated by progressive federalism, such as the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Race to The Top14 and the replication of the Harlem 
Children’s Zone model through the Promise Neighborhoods program.15 
The allure of progressive federalism has only grown in the wake of the 
2016 election. But those who are tempted by the promise of progressive 
federalism would do well to examine the devolution and subsequent 
deterioration of TANF. 
Scholars have identified various forms of federalism, including 
cooperative and uncooperative, opt-in and polyphonic.16 Many detect 
examples of these theories in American law.17 Some have seen the virtues 
of a federal system because it promotes a productive redundancy, for 
dialogic or enforcement reasons.18 Others have challenged the 
jurisdictional formalism of federalism, calling for a look at the other 
institutions that are not state or federal, but translocal, interdependent, and 
transnational.19 Some of these accounts have focused on substantive areas 
                                                     
Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem: The Case of the National 
Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 160 (2012). 
13. See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, The Promise of Progressive Federalism, in 
REMAKING AMERICA 205, 205 (Jacob Hacker ed., 2007) (arguing that “the progressive disposition 
against federalism is outdated”); Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY 
(2012), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism/ [https://perma.cc/ 
GQX3-G82Q] (arguing that it is a “mistake to equate federalism’s past with its future”). 
14. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE INNOVATION IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS UNDER 
RACE TO THE TOP, at iv (2015), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/rttfinalrptfull.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZKB4-2TR9].  
15. Programs: Promise Neighborhoods, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INNOVATION & 
IMPROVEMENT (July 27, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/promiseneighborhoods/index.html  
[https://perma.cc/EF5F-XHK4]. 
16. See generally ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009); Jessica Bulman-Pozen 
& Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1308 (2009); Brendan S. 
Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1779 (2011). 
17. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1550 (2012) 
(“Every flavor of federalism can be found somewhere in our system.”).  
18. See generally Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, 22 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 639 (1981); Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012 
SUP. CT. REV. 31; Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach 
(with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2013).  
19. Judith Resnik, What’s Federalism for?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 269 (Jack M. Balkin 
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of law.20 Others have sought to confront and challenge criticisms of 
federalism and state autonomy.21 
Some scholars admit that there is a need for case-specific federalism.22 
Perhaps legal scholars would rather defer to subject-matter experts to 
suggest which version of federalism best describes a given field.23 Rather 
than leave it to policymakers to operationalize federalism, legal scholars 
themselves should seek to understand how government creates and 
maintains federalist structures in specific policy arenas.24 Now that 
scholars have broken through the states’ rights versus national standards 
debate of the twentieth century and provided us with a more sophisticated 
understanding of a continuum of federalism, we would do well to test 
those various federalist designs against areas of substantive law and 
policy. 
A case-study approach to federalism would yield multiple benefits to 
the field. First, it would force scholars who are debating the costs and 
benefits of various federalism designs to be more forthcoming about 
which areas of substantive law they have in mind. Some scholars have 
championed federalism in the name of a specific area of law like 
environmental law.25 By drawing on cases to support their normative 
claims about federalism, scholars would arrive at a better understanding 
of which areas of law are best suited for which level of government. 
                                                     
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); see also Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto 
at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors 
(TOGAs), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 709, 726–28 (2008). 
20. See supra notes 1–3; infra note 103. 
21. Gerken, supra note 13; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a 
Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1574 (1994) (explaining how “state governments 
help diversify participants in the political process” (citation omitted)). 
22. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 16, at 1308 (admitting to have “deliberately 
offered a simplified account of uncooperative federalism in order to present our thesis in a clear and 
crisp form” and suggesting that “[c]ase studies would be particularly helpful in adding needed texture 
to the story about states we have offered here”); Gerken, supra note 17, at 1552 (insisting that 
“[f]ederalism debates are best understood not as disagreements over which model to choose but as 
disputes over how to strike the right balance between different types of institutional arrangements,” 
but that “[s]uch debates, however, can only be hashed out in context-domain by domain, 
policymaking arena by policymaking arena”); see also Ernest A. Young, A Research Agenda for 
Uncooperative Federalists, 48 TULSA L. REV. 427, 453 (2013). 
23. Gerken, supra note 17, at 1573 (“It would not be surprising that a field as complex and 
variegated as federalism required more than one theory to describe it.”). 
24. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State 
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 577 (2011) 
(showing how “within the [Affordable Care Act] alone, there are multiple—and sometimes 
conflicting—visions of the role of the states”). 
25. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–21 (1992) 
(explaining why the “Race to the Bottom” theory is misguided).  
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Second, these case studies would inevitably impact and alter our 
understanding of federalism, causing scholars to tweak and adapt their 
accounts as thick descriptions of substantive law illuminate cracks in their 
theories. 
Last and perhaps most importantly, case-specific federalism would be 
more useful to policymakers and bureaucrats who must design policies, 
draft statutes, and implement programs. Rather than forcing 
decisionmakers to enter a broad, trans-substantive scholarly debate, one 
replete with its own academic argot, scholars could come to 
decisionmakers, deploying their insights to inform policymaking. A more 
accessible academic conversation might lead to more contributions by the 
bureaucrats themselves, whose understanding of both the regulatory detail 
and implementation reality of these programs contains a remarkable 
wealth of institutional knowledge that scholars often miss. It is time for 
scholars of federalism to capture the experience and legacy of specific 
programs in various areas of law. One such area that is ripe for inquiry is 
social welfare policy, an area that contains various federal-state schemes. 
B. TANF as a Federalism Case Study in American Social Policy 
American social policy is a revealing area to chart changes in federal-
state relations. Thirty years ago, a poor single mother with two children 
encountered a safety net that included a national entitlement to cash 
assistance, some food assistance, federal health insurance, and nearly no 
subsidies for low-wage work. Today, a similarly situated mother 
encounters a safety net in which traditional “welfare” has all but 
disappeared, but the federal government has dramatically expanded health 
insurance and food assistance and created subsidies for low-wage 
workers. 
Each of these forms of social assistance contains a different federal-
state infrastructure.26 TANF is federally funded through a block grant with 
wide discretion given to the state on benefit level, eligibility, and 
sanctions.27 While SNAP is federally funded and administered by states, 
SNAP is funded through a means-tested entitlement rather than a block 
grant, and states pay only a portion of the administrative costs of the 
                                                     
26. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 62 (2011) (pointing to safety net 
programs as federal examples “that allow states to propose variations on generally applicable 
standards within programs of cooperative federalism, often through demonstration waiver 
programs”).  
27. 42 U.S.C. § 603 et seq. (2012).  
05 - Hammond.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:39 AM 
1728 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1721 
 
program.28 The federal government pays for every dollar of SNAP 
benefits.29 SSI is federally funded and administered by local offices of the 
Social Security Administration, a federal agency. EITC is both federally 
funded and centrally administered by the IRS, although states have begun 
to add their own refundable tax-credits for low-income families.30 
While American social policy is rich in its federalist permutations, one 
must not overstate the applicable lessons from a study of one program. 
TANF is only one strand of the American safety net, and this Article 
analyzes a particular aspect of this program: namely, the block grant as a 
federalist-informed funding mechanism. Yet, it is fitting to focus on the 
block grant for it is this feature that should be of most interest to students 
of federalism. 
A block grant is a funding mechanism that gives states more discretion 
than they typically have when implementing a federal program—whether 
that program’s implementing regulations are largely set by the federal 
government, as in the case of some Social Security benefits, or allow for 
cooperation between federal and state agencies, as in the case of SNAP.31 
As this Article will demonstrate, the TANF block grant allows states to 
use funds in various ways, including several that depart significantly from 
the authorizing statute.32 But this analysis of the TANF block grant and 
its consequences for our understanding of federalism should be carefully 
extended to other areas of federalist social policy, and even more 
cautiously to other areas of law. Cash assistance has often been a 
particularly fraught area of law, politics, and policy—and controversies 
over the substance of the program might make its federalist design 
difficult to disentangle from the vagaries of racialized attitudes and 
partisan politics. 
Nonetheless, TANF is a particularly important case study because it 
was born out of an attempt to devolve authority to the states in order to 
reform the substance of the program. Before looking at the consequences 
of those changes for the program (and for theories of federalism), it would 
be useful to briefly recount how states, in effect, led the nation in 
reforming welfare. 
                                                     
28. 7 U.S.C. § 2025 (2012). 
29. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SNAP ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS, AUDIT REPORT 27601-
0003-22 (2016), https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/27601-0003-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ4W-
D7XT] (“FNS funds the full cost of SNAP benefits and generally reimburses the States for 50 percent 
of their administrative costs.”). 
30. See Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), IRS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/credits-
deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/9L2P-KZ72]. 
31. ROBERT JAY DILGER & EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40486, BLOCK GRANTS: 
PERSPECTIVES AND CONTROVERSIES (2014). 
32. See infra section I.D. 
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II. THE CREATION (AND SUBSEQUENT DETERIORATION) OF 
TANF 
In Part II, I briefly detail the drive to replace Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with TANF in 1996 before explaining the 
devolutionary design written into TANF and how the block grant 
mechanism guaranteed the program’s deterioration. By moving TANF to 
a block grant structure, Congress effectively mandated benefit cuts and 
made this federal funding particularly susceptible to repurposing by cash-
strapped states. This structure, in turn, undermines the program’s potential 
to shield families from extreme poverty and leaves millions of vulnerable 
Americans without income assistance. 
A. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996 
There is a plethora of scholarship on the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), including 
comprehensive econometric evaluations, ethnographic studies of former 
recipients, and longitudinal studies of the 1996 legislation.33 This account 
focuses on its federalist structure and the role of states in designing the 
legislation. 
AFDC was intended to provide financial assistance to needy children. 
Initially it did not provide assistance for a parent or other caretaker in an 
eligible child’s household.34 Over the next fifty years, AFDC eligibility 
expanded to cover caretakers of needy children, including unemployed 
parents.35 As those families with deceased or disabled caretakers became 
eligible in the 1980s for a more generous benefit through Social Security, 
the remaining recipients of AFDC were predominantly single mothers and 
their children. Yet, it was the increase of the AFDC caseload just at the 
time that states were attempting to reduce expenditures that led to an 
                                                     
33. See, e.g., JEFFREY GROGGER & LYNN A. KAROLY, WELFARE REFORM: EFFECTS OF A DECADE 
OF CHANGE 5 (2005) (describing their approach as “extend[ing] the traditional economic model of 
welfare incentives to analyze the effects of recent reforms on outcomes such as welfare use, 
employment, labor supply, and income”); RON HASKINS, WORK OVER WELFARE: THE INSIDE STORY 
OF THE 1996 WELFARE REFORM LAW xii (2006) (in which the author describes himself as having 
“help[ed] develop, draft, and guide the welfare reform bill through Congress”).  
34. See JANET M. CURRIE, THE INVISIBLE SAFETY NET 18 (2006); Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children: The Baseline, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://aspe.hhs.gov/HSP/AFDC/ 
afdcbase98exhib.htm [https://perma.cc/VS35-9UB4] [hereinafter Aid to Families]. 
35. In 1950, the federal government added a provision for maintenance costs of the caretaker of the 
eligible child. In 1961, the child of an unemployed parent and that parent (referred to as AFDC-
Unemployment) could receive assistance under AFDC.  
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explosion of state-level experimentation. 
The AFDC caseload increased into the 1980s, spurring the passage of 
the Family Support Act (FSA) of 1988.36 The FSA required most welfare 
recipients to enter the labor force or engage in education or training, unless 
they had children under the age of three.37 Such a policy was easier 
mandated than done. Dramatically increased caseloads meant increased 
expenditures, all at a time when state revenues were shrinking due to the 
1991 recession.38 Unlike the federal government, which could avoid 
raising taxes or decreasing spending simply by adding to the national debt, 
most state governments were legally required to balance their budgets.39 
As a result, states applied for waivers from AFDC program rules under 
section 1115 of the Social Security Act.40 From 1988 to 1992, the Bush 
administration granted permission to twelve states, including then-
Governor Bill Clinton’s Arkansas, to waive AFDC requirements.41 States 
used the waivers to experiment in various ways, including introducing 
higher earnings disregards and asset tests. However, most involved 
increased uses of sanctions, the introduction of family caps, and other 
means by which to push recipients off the welfare rolls, all of which would 
reduce expenditures.42 By 1994, the National Governors’ Association 
reported that forty-eight states had implemented welfare reform measures 
beyond those required under the federal law.43 
President Clinton entered the White House in 1993 with a campaign 
pledge “to end welfare as we know it.”44 Clinton had raised the issue of 
welfare reform so often on the campaign trail that eight days after his 
                                                     
36. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). 
37. Id. § 301. 
38. JAMES P. ZILIAK, WELFARE REFORM AND ITS LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES FOR AMERICA’S 
POOR 3 (2009). 
39. Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J. F. 1, 9–10 (2017) 
(“With the exception of Vermont, the states are legally obliged to balance their budgets every year.”). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2012); see also Joel F. Handler, Welfare-to-Work: Reform or Rhetoric?, 50 
ADMIN. L. REV. 635, 638 n.20 (1998). 
41. See Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The Bush Legacy, 15 FOCUS 18 (1993), 
https://irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc151b.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NNB-TTDM]. 
42. GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 33 at 125–28; see also Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in 
Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 
165–67 (2006). 
43. NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, FINAL REPORT: THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION 
SURVEY OF STATE WELFARE REFORMS (1994). 
44. See Bill Clinton in 1992 Ad: “A Plan to End Welfare as We Know It,” WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 
2016, 11:31 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/bill-clinton-in-1992-ad-a-plan-to-
end-welfare-as-we-know-it/2016/08/30/9e6350f8-6ee0-11e6-993f-73c693a89820_video.html 
[https://perma.cc/BG9J-7ZTS].  
05 - Hammond.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:39 AM 
2017] WELFARE AND FEDERALISM’S PERIL 1731 
 
inauguration, when asked to name Clinton’s most important promises, 
voters’ third most common response was welfare reform.45 The Clinton 
Administration had signaled during the campaign, the transition, and its 
first years in office that an overhaul of social assistance was a domestic 
priority. 
Despite the constant rhetoric of welfare reform during the campaign, 
the Clinton Administration was hampered by budget rules and spending 
caps in its first year in office. Initially, the Administration proposed a 
welfare reform package in its 1993 budget legislation.46 The Clinton 
welfare reform proposal would have made AFDC a temporary benefit of 
two years and moved recipients into work with subsidies for job training, 
child care, and transportation costs.47 The Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990, however, limited the Clinton Administration in its options to reform 
entitlement programs, including AFDC, by requiring any proposed 
additional spending on a program be offset by cuts within that program or 
by other cuts in entitlement spending or by new taxes.48 The Clinton 
Administration needed to raise taxes in 1993 if it were to meet its deficit 
reduction targets and finance new spending on various initiatives. 
Initially, Clinton’s welfare reform proposal was included in the 1993 
budget, but it was removed at the final internal meeting in the White 
House before the administration submitted the budget to Congress, 
apparently over concerns that the $3 billion cost estimate would be 
significantly higher and reluctance to exceed the target of $140 billion in 
new spending.49 By contrast, the Administration retained the full amount 
of $27 billion to make good on Clinton’s campaign promise of expanding 
the EITC.50 
Scholars agree that the bill signed by President Clinton three years later 
marked a radical shift in American social assistance policy.51 PRWORA 
ended the federal entitlement program, AFDC, and replaced it with 
                                                     
45. BOB WOODWARD, THE AGENDA 109 (1994). The first two were job creation and healthcare 
reform. Id.  
46. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (Feb. 17, 1993), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232 [https://perma.cc/K46M-
HTRZ]. 
47. Id. 
48. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). 
49. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism of America’s 
Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 145 (1996) (citation omitted).  
50. WOODWARD, supra note 45, at 126.  
51. See, e.g., Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, A Public Transformed? Welfare Reform and Policy 
Feedback, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111, 112–13 (2007) (describing welfare policy as a tempting target 
for “Democrats looking for a way to change the political terrain”). 
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TANF.52 TANF, like AFDC, is a means-tested program, but there the 
similarities end.53 TANF marked a significant departure from AFDC in 
three fundamental ways: the elimination of the entitlement; the funding 
mechanism; and the eligibility criteria, including the introduction of time 
limits, family caps, sanctions, and the citizen/non-citizen distinction.54 
The most striking item of the American welfare reform legislation was 
the elimination of the legal entitlement to federal cash assistance. Under 
the new law, the fifty state governments were freed from their 
commitment to provide cash assistance to needy families: no individual 
could sue the state for failing to provide a benefit for which that individual 
is legally eligible.55 
In terms of funding, federal cash assistance went from a matching 
formula that was an open-ended commitment on the part of the national 
government under AFDC to a pre-appropriated block grant for each 
state.56 That grant was calculated to equal the highest level of annual 
spending for each state in the three years prior to 1996.57 Yet any funds 
saved at the state level by reducing caseloads would be released to the 
states to be used for any other purpose58—a feature common in other block 
grants because of the relatively lax reporting requirements imposed on 
states by the federal government. This feature provided a further financial 
incentive for states to reduce the number of people claiming TANF. Under 
PRWORA, states could not reduce the amount they spent on TANF by 
more than 25% of what they spent in 1994.59 
                                                     
52. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112–61 (1996) (creating TANF block grants in place of AFDC). 
53. Jacob S. Hacker, Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The New Politics of Inequality: A Policy-
Centered Perspective, in REMAKING AMERICA, supra note 13, at 3 (claiming that PRWORA 
“redefined the purpose of public assistance and ended entitlements for the poorest Americans”). 
54. Under AFDC, some states were able to apply for waivers from the federal government that 
would allow them to implement some of these measures; but these waivers failed to reach the scale 
or scope of the PRWORA reforms. 
55. Michael Wiseman, Welfare in the United States, in THE WELFARE WE WANT? THE BRITISH 
CHALLENGE FOR AMERICAN REFORM 25, 37 (2003) (“No feature of recent developments in the US 
more dramatically contrasts with European social assistance concepts than the provision in the 
PRWORA that eliminated the right of categorically eligible families to obtain cash assistance.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
56. Aid to Families, supra note 34; see also LIZ SCHOTT, LADONNA PAVETTI & IFE FINCH, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, HOW STATES HAVE SPENT FEDERAL AND STATE FUNDS UNDER 
THE TANF BLOCK GRANT (2012), https://www.cbpp.org/research/how-states-have-spent-federal-
and-state-funds-under-the-tanf-block-grant [https://perma.cc/G4SG-FEEE]. 
57. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193 § 403(a), 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
58. SCHOTT, PAVETTI & FINCH, supra note 56. 
59. Wiseman, supra note 55, at 36. 
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In terms of eligibility criteria, TANF attached several conditions to the 
receipt of benefits that were not present pre-PRWORA.60 Adults receiving 
TANF were required to work after two years of receiving the benefit. 
Furthermore, once individuals received TANF assistance for five years, 
they were banned from receiving further benefits for life.61 According to 
the federal government’s 2000 Green Book, the authoritative guide to 
benefits rules, states could exempt 20% of their caseload from this lifetime 
ban, but the legislation also required “a specified and rising percentage of 
the total caseload to engage in work activities.”62 
In terms of sanctions, if any adult recipient of TANF did not engage in 
work, PRWORA required the state to either reduce aid to the family in 
proportion to the period of work inactivity or to cut off aid altogether.63 
States could also reduce a family’s benefit “by an amount the State 
considers appropriate if a family member fails” to adhere to an individual 
responsibility plan, unless with good cause, that he or she has signed.64 
On top of these new conditions, states were given further discretion in 
the ability to deny benefits or impose sanctions. First, states could render 
mothers under the age of eighteen and their children ineligible for TANF 
unless they live with an adult.65 Second, states were allowed to impose 
family caps.66 Family cap policies required that benefits would not 
increase if an additional child was born outside marriage while the mother 
was receiving benefits.67 Also known as the “child exclusion policy,” the 
family cap policy repealed the standard calculation in which assistance for 
parents is determined by how many children that parent has.68  In effect, 
                                                     
60. See 45 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2006). 
61. Id. 
62. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 106TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON 
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (GREEN BOOK) 
353 (Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK]. 
63. Federal law exempted a single parent caring for a child under the age of six who could not work 
because he or she was unable to obtain child care. The legislation did not define the “pro rata” 
reduction nor did the regulations offer any guidance. As of 2000, about one-third of states ended the 
benefit after the first violation. Id. at 358. 
64. Id. 
65. See Major Provisions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, OFF. FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (Dec. 16, 1996), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/law-reg/finalrule/aspesum [https://perma.cc/5BYN-C4ZP]  
(“Unmarried teen parents must stay in school and live at home or in an adult-supervised setting.”). 
66. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-924, MORE RESEARCH NEEDED ON TANF 
FAMILY CAPS AND OTHER POLICIES FOR REDUCING OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS (2001). 
67. Id. at 2, 5. 
68. See SHELLEY STARK & JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CLASP, EXCLUDED CHILDREN: FAMILY CAP IN 
A NEW ERA (1999), https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/ 
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if a mother is raising two children in poverty and then has another child 
while on welfare, the government will not increase the amount of cash 
assistance given to that family. Twenty-three states adopted the policy 
following the enactment of the 1996 legislation.69 Finally, unless a state 
opted out by changing their state law, the Welfare Reform Act banned 
felons as well as probation or parole violators convicted of a drug-related 
felony from receiving cash assistance.70 
PRWORA also dramatically restricted legal immigrants’ eligibility for 
TANF and other federal means-tested benefits.71 Legal immigrants who 
arrived in the country after PRWORA was signed into law were barred 
from TANF, Food Stamps, non-emergency Medicaid, Supplemental 
Security Income, and the state-based Children Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP).72 In regards to TANF, states could create a substitute program for 
immigrant families to replace the terminated benefits from federal cash 
assistance, but they could only use funds from their block grant for this 
purpose if these families had lived in the United States for at least five 
years.73 For the first five years of residence, states would have to use their 
own funds. Twenty-eight states responded to this elimination of federal 
eligibility by creating their own programs, but those programs often 
reflected tightened conditionality including requirements for residency 
and naturalization as well as time limits.74 Several states have chosen to 
continue to allow immigrant families to receive TANF or SNAP during 
their first five years of residency.75 As one researcher has written, 
“PRWORA institutionalized the concept of immigrant exceptionalism—
                                                     
archive/0030.pdf [https://perma.cc/W29G-LRRY]. 
69. Id. at 1 (“[Twenty-three] states have established some type of family cap or child exclusion 
policy.”). 
70. GREEN BOOK, supra note 62, at 355. 
71. See generally MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY PASSEL, URBAN INST., THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF 
WELFARE REFORM’S IMMIGRANT PROVISIONS 2 (2002), webarchive.urban.org/Uploadedpdf/ 
410412_discussion02-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/974R-353C].  
72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996, at 26 
(1996), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/14858 [https://perma.cc/LN3C-AUW2] (detailing how 
“Title IV [of PRWORA] limits the eligibility of legal aliens for public assistance programs”). 
73. GREEN BOOK, supra note 62, at 355. 
74. KAREN C. TUMLIN & WENDY ZIMMERMAN, URBAN INST., IMMIGRANTS AND TANF: A LOOK 
AT IMMIGRANT WELFARE RECIPIENTS IN THREE CITIES (2003), http://webarchive.urban.org/ 
publications/310874.html [https://perma.cc/TJ9F-8VDB]. 
75. Mapping Public Benefits for Immigrants in the States, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 24, 
2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2014/09/mapping-public- 
benefits-for-immigrants-in-the-states [https://perma.cc/KW8V-44E7]. 
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treating noncitizens differently from similarly situated citizens—to a new 
and unprecedented degree in social welfare policy.”76 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 restored access to Supplemental 
Security Income and Medicaid for elderly and disabled immigrants.77 This 
restoration of benefits was followed by the Agricultural Research, 
Extension, and Education Reform Act (AREERA) of 1998, which 
restored Food Stamp eligibility for immigrant children living in the United 
States prior to the passage of PRWORA.78 Immigrant children and their 
parents were still barred from accessing TANF, and any children and 
parents living in the United States following August 22, 1996 were barred 
from collecting Food Stamps.79 As the government’s Green Book stated, 
“[t]he basic policy laid out by the 1996 welfare law remains essentially 
unchanged for noncitizens entering after its enactment.”80 
In addition to its overhaul of federal cash assistance, the 1996 
PRWORA legislation also consolidated federal spending on child care 
into the Child Care and Development Block Grant and added an additional 
$4 billion.81 Yet AFDC had required states to guarantee child care to 
benefit recipients who needed it because of labor market participation or 
education.82 TANF had no such guarantee.83 
B. The Role of States in Enacting Welfare Reform 
Many scholars insist that policymakers typically have a set of options 
to confront a public problem, and that those options are often variations 
on past or existing policies.84 Yet, one of the striking characteristics of this 
                                                     
76. KAREN C. TUMLIN & WENDY ZIMMERMAN, URBAN INST., PATCHWORK POLICIES: STATE 
ASSISTANCE FOR IMMIGRANTS UNDER WELFARE REFORM 5 (1999), https://www.urban.org/sites 
/default/files/publication/69586/309007-Patchwork-Policies-State-Assistance-for-Immigrants-
under-Welfare-Reform.PDF [https://perma.cc/F8JY-SFKK]. 
77. Balanced Budget Act, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997). 
78. Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-185, 
112 Stat. 523 (1998).  
79. Pub. L. No. 105-33; Pub. L. No. 105-185. 
80. GREEN BOOK, supra note 62, at 1372. 
81. OFFICE OF CHILD CARE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., “FUN”DAMENTALS OF 
CCDF ADMINISTRATION (2013), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/occ/fundamentals_of_ 
ccdf_administration.pdf [https://perma.cc/P57N-HRFS].  
82. R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 77 (2000). 
83. See KAREN SCHULMAN & ABBIE STARKER, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., TEMPORARY 
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES AND CHILD CARE ASSISTANCE: A WEAKENED SAFETY NET FOR 
FAMILIES (2016), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/TANF-Child-Care-Fact-Sheet-11.4. 
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PDH-ECEK]. 
84. PAUL SPICKER, POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PRACTICE: APPLYING SOCIAL POLICY (2006).  
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period in American social welfare policy is the introduction of 
unprecedented approaches to cash assistance, including the introduction 
of family caps, lifetime bans, sanctions, and the citizen/non-citizen 
distinction. Some have sought to explain the introduction of these new 
policies as the result of Congressional Republicans rewriting the terms of 
welfare reform in the 1990s.85 While their majorities in Congress certainly 
did empower Republican members to propose reforms that diverged from 
previous changes to cash assistance, these reforms still had to come from 
somewhere. The source of these new policies was not singular, but rather, 
from various states, most under the leadership of Republican Governors, 
which had obtained waivers from the federal government relieving them 
of the national standards of AFDC and permitting statewide 
experimentation. The Governors not only provided policy alternatives to 
the federal cash assistance scheme, which put additional pressure on 
national reform efforts, but they also actively lobbied for PRWORA 
itself.86 Understanding how this waiver system came about and why the 
states experimented in the ways they did helps explain the peculiar 
character of welfare.87 
The use of time limits, family caps, and the citizen/non-citizen 
distinction can be traced to reforms originating in Wisconsin, New Jersey, 
and California, respectively. The emphasis on time limits and a “work-
first approach” dates to Wisconsin’s efforts and others in the 1980s and 
1990s.88 Wisconsin has been known for policy experimentation since the 
beginning of the twentieth century; welfare was no exception.89 Indeed, 
                                                     
85. See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 82, at 252–93 (describing how the “electoral earthquake” 
ushering in a new GOP majority in both houses created a “new dynamic” in welfare reform). 
86. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1105–06 (2014) 
(characterizing Governors’ efforts to convert cash assistance into a block grant as “at once a push to 
devolve power to the states and a push to move the substantive commitments of welfare policy in a 
Republican direction” (citation omitted)); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 16, at 1275–76 
(recounting that “states like Michigan and Wisconsin played a powerful role in reshaping national 
welfare policy” and that “[m]ost of their goals were realized when Congress passed [PRWORA]”); 
Russell A. Miller, Clinton, Ginsburg, and Centrist Federalism, 85 IND. L.J. 225, 243–46 (2010) 
(ascribing the states “a significant role in the negotiations for and enactment of [PRWORA]”). 
87. See generally HASKINS, supra note 33, at 20–36 (describing the source of welfare reform 
provisions); Miller, supra note 86, at 243–46 (“State autonomy was both the essential driver and aim 
of [the block grant structure].” (citations omitted)). 
88. See Robert Walker et al., Successful Welfare-to-Work Programs: Were Riverside and Portland 
Really that Good?, 22 FOCUS 1, 11 (2003), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc223 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD35-GASQ]; Pamela A. Holcomb et al., Work First and Other Work-
Oriented Strategies in Five States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 1, 1998), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/building-employment-focused-welfare-system 
[https://perma.cc/EW3S-VG4H]. 
89. See generally JAMES K. CONANT, WISCONSIN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: AMERICA’S 
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one study of welfare reform in Wisconsin counted seventeen different 
regulations or programs modifying AFDC in the period from 1979 to 
1994.90 Beginning with the Work Experience and Job Training (WEJT) 
program in 1986, Wisconsin required full participation in work-related 
activities for any recipient with children aged three months or older. 
Culminating in “Work, Not Welfare” in 1993, Wisconsin limited AFDC 
benefits to twenty-four cumulative months within a four-year period and 
ensured that benefit receipt is conditional on participation in work-related 
activities.91 
In 1967, Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, a family cap 
provision.92 However, a family cap did pass in January 1992 in New 
Jersey.93 Despite being an affluent state with generous benefit levels and 
Democratic leadership, the state legislature passed the family cap law as 
part of their Family Development Plan (FDP), which restructured the 
state’s implementation of AFDC.94 While the regulation had not been 
proven to have any effect on recipients’ behavior, the law received 
national attention.95 
Before PRWORA enacted bans on benefits for non-citizens, California 
had debated and eventually approved a two-tiered benefit system for 
citizens and non-citizens.96 Following the 1992 election, the California 
state legislature enacted a two-tier welfare payment strategy, drastically 
reducing access for immigrants.97 In 1994, the “Save Our State” initiative, 
eliminating illegal immigrants’ access to health, education and welfare 
programs, was approved in a state-wide referendum.98 Unlike the 
California referendum that excluded illegal immigrants, the PRWORA 
                                                     
LABORATORY OF DEMOCRACY (2006).  
90. Thomas J. Corbett, Welfare Reform in Wisconsin, in THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 19, 
23–26 (Donald F. Norris & Lyke Thompson eds., 1994) [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM].  
91. See id. at 25–26. 
92. Patricia Donovan, Does the Family Cap Influence Birthrates? Two New Studies Say ‘No’, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 1998), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/1998/02/does-family-cap-
influence-birthrates-two-new-studies-say-no [https://perma.cc/6K53-C2V9].  
93. Ted George Goertzel & John Hart, New Jersey’s $64 Question, in WELFARE REFORM, supra 
note 90, at 109.  
94. Id.  
95. See generally id. 
96. See Jenifer M. Bosco, Note, Undocumented Immigrants, Economic Justice, and Welfare 
Reform in California, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 71, 71–75 (1994).  
97. See generally id.  
98. See generally id.; Jonathan Freedman, Save Our State? It’s More Like Spite Our State, L.A. 
TIMES (July 19, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-07-19/local/me-17266_1_illegal-immigrants 
[https://perma.cc/FK4A-JYVE].  
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provision focused on legal immigrants. Still, California is considered to 
be the first state government to enact the proposal to reduce expenditure 
on cash assistance by restricting access to immigrants. 
The experience of state-level experimentation with AFDC drastically 
expanded the range of policy options that were considered at the national 
level.99 Congressional Republicans drew from this explosion of policy 
innovation when drafting a welfare reform proposal to compete with the 
one written by the Clinton Administration. As a result, in a divided 
government, the legislation that ultimately passed in 1996 reflected a 
combination of proposals from both the President and Congress, but those 
proposals made by Congress found their policy precedent in state-level 
experimentation that began decades before.100 
Some scholars who have moved beyond explanations of the source 
material for TANF to examine TANF’s record often emphasize other 
actions by states, such as tightening eligibility for immigrant families,101 
setting more parsimonious asset and time limits, and recent proposals to 
drug test TANF applicants.102 States certainly enjoyed far greater 
discretion to determine eligibility than they had pre-PRWORA.103 States 
have reduced the amount of time a poor family can receive cash assistance 
over their lifetimes. The federal statute requires that no family can receive 
assistance for more than twenty-four consecutive months and no family 
                                                     
99. See Sugarman, supra note 49, at 147 (arguing that Congress devolved authority to lower 
visibility of some controversial reforms “by passing off the responsibility elsewhere, these legislators 
are hoping that the states, or at least some of them, will do the sort of dirty work that Congress dare 
not do”). 
100. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 66 
(2010) (“States can use federal welfare monies to build a program that will ultimately serve as a model 
for dismantling the federal system, as did Michigan and Wisconsin.”). 
101. See generally Geoffrey Heeren, Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of 
Immigrants in the United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367 (2013); Rick Su, The States of 
Immigration, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339 (2013); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry: 
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 
(2001). 
102. Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1203 (11th Cir. 2013); 
see generally GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 
FAMILIES (TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 5 (2014); SIGNE-MARY MCKERNAN & MICHAEL WAYNE SHERRADEN, ASSET-BUILDING 
AND LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 164 (2008); Philippa M. Guthrie, Drug Testing and Welfare: Taking the 
Drug War to Unconstitutional Limits?, 66 IND. L.J. 579 (1991).  
103. Shep Melnick, Entrepreneurial Litigation: Advocacy Coalitions and Strategies in the 
Fragmented American Welfare State, in REMAKING AMERICA, supra note 13, at 58 (“Not until 
1996—nearly thirty years after the first legal assault on AFDC practices—did Congress hand control 
of eligibility standards back to the states.”); see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS 
AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960–73, at 81–98 (1993) (recounting how newly funded 
legal aid lawyers won several cases that limited state discretion). 
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can receive cash assistance for sixty months, regardless of whether they 
are consecutive. But many states have shortened that lifetime limit.104 
States have also imposed asset limits on TANF recipients, kicking 
families off the program once they have assets valued at as little as 
$2,000.105 Some states include cars in that asset test.106 By setting a limit 
on the amount of savings a needy family can accrue or preventing them 
from owning a car, states undermine one of the purported purposes of 
TANF: encouraging families to become self-sufficient. Similarly, states 
have also reduced education and training services for TANF parents.107 In 
the last few years, states have introduced drug testing as an additional 
requirement for families to receive TANF.108 Federal courts have struck 
down these new policies as violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.109 And the policies that states implemented before the court 
challenges were found to have no effect on a population that has lower 
rates of drug use than the general population.110 In light of these state 
policies restricting eligibility, shortening time limits, and reducing 
benefits, it is not shocking that TANF caseloads rose only by 15% in the 
                                                     
104. See MARY FARRELL ET AL., LEWIN GRP. & MDRC, WELFARE TIME LIMITS: AN UPDATE ON 
STATE POLICIES, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS ON FAMILIES (2008), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/ 
default/files/full_609.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE3B-CF9E]; Kyoung Hag Lee, Effect of Lifetime Limits 
and Differences Between TANF Leavers Who Had Reached Their Lifetime Limits and Those Who 
Had Exited Voluntarily, 2 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 27, 29 (2010). 
105. See FALK, supra note 102, at summary.  
106. See Laura Pereya, TANF’s Counterproductive Asset Tests: Eliminating the Tests Will Help 
Families While Saving States Money, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 6, 2010, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2010/05/06/7846/tanfs-counterproductive-
asset-tests/ [https://perma.cc/8DMF-GXT4]. 
107. See ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL’Y, EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
FOR TANF RECIPIENTS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES UNDER THE FINAL RULE 3 (2008), 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/13832 [https://perma.cc/KG6K-2GB4]. 
108. Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. 
(Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/drug-testing-and-public-
assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc/A6T3-Q7QD]. 
109. See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1203 (11th 
Cir. 2013) (striking down Florida statute drug-testing all TANF applicants); see generally Guthrie, 
supra note 102. 
110. CLASP, TANF POLICY BRIEF: RANDOM DRUG TESTING OF TANF RECIPIENTS IS COSTLY, 
INEFFECTIVE AND HURTS FAMILIES (2013), https://www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/ 
publication-1/520.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN34-Y343]; Lavanya Mohan, Few TANF Applicants Test 
Positive for Drug Use; Testing Is Costly and Ineffective, CLASP (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.clasp.org/issues/temporary-assistance/in-focus/few-tanf-applicants-test-positive-for-
drug-use-testing-is-costly-and-ineffective [https://perma.cc/8VGD-Q8HJ]; see also ASPE, DRUG 
TESTING WELFARE RECIPIENTS: RECENT PROPOSALS AND CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES (2011), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/11/DrugTesting/ib.shtml [https://perma.cc/ 8YNG-3MJW]. 
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deepest economic crisis since the Great Recession.111 
To a large extent, state changes to TANF are hard to detect, analyze, 
and compare. The administration of public benefit programs depends on 
sophisticated data analysis,112 but states often lack the resources to collect 
data, let alone analyze it.113 The label “laboratories of democracy” is 
misleading in the context of TANF because neither the states nor the 
federal government systematically evaluate state experimentation in 
TANF.114 Then there is the phenomenon of sub-delegation to counties and 
private contractors.115 Other scholars have pointed out that this idea of 
democratic experimentation is not only inherent in state-level innovation, 
it might be better served by centralized programming.116 Others have 
                                                     
111. See Jason DeParle, Welfare Limits Left Poor Adrift as Recession Hit, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/us/welfare-limits-left-poor-adrift-as-recession-hit.html? 
mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/5MQT-66UM] (“Compared with the 1990s peak, the national welfare 
rolls are still down by 68 percent. Just one in five poor children now receives cash aid, the lowest 
level in nearly 50 years.”). 
112. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 458–
59 (2008); see also Welfare Reform: A New Conversation on Women and Poverty: Hearing Before 
the Comm. on Fin. U.S. S., 111th Cong. 11–13 (2010) [hereinafter Welfare Reform] (statement of 
Gordon L. Berlin, President of MDRC) (imploring Congress to focus on collecting more data from 
the states). 
113. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of 
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 545 (2008) (offering a “critique of decentralized 
participatory decision making” based on the lack of consensus on the nature of the problems, reliable 
metrics, and significant resource constraints and arguing instead for a centralized policymaking); see 
also Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
239, 268 n.118  (quoting Super, supra note 113, at 556) (“TANF is characterized by devolution and 
abandonment of the safety net.”). 
114. See David Lowery, Virginia Gray & Frank R. Baumgartner, Policy Attention in State and 
Nation: Is Anyone Listening to the Laboratories of Democracy?, 41 PUBLIUS 286, 304 (2010) (finding 
“little evidence that changes in state policy agendas in the aggregate influence national patterns of 
policy attention”); Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, States’ Welfare Data in Disarray, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 13, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/welfare/stories/wf04 
1398.htm [https://perma.cc/29BG-JRSV].  
115. Others have documented this phenomenon. See, e.g., Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How 
the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 
SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 576–77 (2004) (arguing that state and local governments “lack the 
institutional capacity and, oftentimes, the proper incentives to bear primary responsibility for ensuring 
the successful transition of America’s dependent, welfare population to the world of work and 
personal responsibility”); see also Christine N. Cimini, The New Contract: Welfare Reform, 
Devolution, and Due Process, 61 MD. L. REV. 246, 250–51 (2002) (documenting how states have 
devolved further programmatic responsibility to counties); Thomas L. Gais & Cathy M. Johnson, 
Welfare Reform, Management Systems, and Their Implications for Children, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 
1346 (1999) (describing state practice of sub-delegating administrative and policymaking authority 
over welfare services).  
116. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 
498 (1991) (arguing that “if experimentation is our chief desideratum, a purely pyramidic government 
structure may well be preferable, enabling central planners to shape and reshape government 
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argued that experimentalism presumes both reliable metrics with which to 
measure the success or failure of various state efforts as well as a 
consensus among policymakers about which metrics should be used.117 In 
giving states broad discretion without conducting systematic research on 
the effects of program changes on former and current recipients, the 
federal government has let states alter their TANF programs in a 
vacuum.118 Indeed, the federal government does not even require the states 
to report how many TANF families each state is serving through non-cash 
programs and benefits.119 No wonder states’ reports are uneven and 
underspecified.120 
C. The TANF Block Grant: Devolution as Statutized Deterioration 
In light of what welfare reform actually was and the role of states in it, 
it is easier to grasp the consequences of that new devolutionary design for 
the program. As mentioned above, PRWORA did away with using the 
matching formula for cash assistance where the federal government would 
reimburse states anywhere from 1:1 to more than 4:1 of their expenditures 
on cash assistance.121 Typically, the reimbursement rate would be higher 
for states with lower per-capita incomes. PRWORA replaced that open-
ended commitment on the part of the national government under AFDC 
to a pre-appropriated TANF block grant for each state, equal to the highest 
                                                     
boundaries and policies for more carefully controlled experiments”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm 
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 923 (1994). 
117. See Super, supra note 113, at 556 (arguing that without “reliable metrics” that “can be readily 
agreed upon and implemented, for measuring policies’ effectiveness . . . local policy variations will 
be experiments in name only”). 
118. See Michaels, supra note 115, at 576 (cautioning that “significant problems emerge when the 
federal government, ostensibly insistent on meeting certain objective goals, nevertheless abdicates its 
authority and responsibility for overseeing the implementation and for securing the success of the 
biggest restructuring of American welfare policy in generations”). 
119. See FALK, supra note 102, at 1 (concluding that “TANF basic assistance accounts for about 
28.6% of all TANF expenditures”). 
120. See DAVID KASSABIAN ET AL., URBAN INST., WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF 
POLICIES AS OF JULY 2010, at 3 (2011), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/welfare-rules-
databook-state-tanf-policies-july-2010 [https://perma.cc/VLP2-Z8RK] (describing how TANF State 
Plans’ “level of detail varies considerably across states . . . . offer[ing] insufficient information to 
completely understand the details of eligibility, benefit computation, and client requirements” and 
that while “states are expected to notify the federal government if any of their choices change after 
the plan is submitted, they are not required to do so”). As of this writing, the State of Illinois’s most 
recent TANF report is the previous report with some track changes. See Plan for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, ST. OF ILL. (Jan. 1, 2017), http://www.dhs.state.il.us/ 
page.aspx?item=87890 [https://perma.cc/L25D-L8KB]. 
121. See FALK, supra note 102, at 6.  
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level of annual spending for each state in the three years prior to 1996.122 
Crucially, any funds saved at the state level by reducing caseloads would 
be released to the states to be used for any other purposes, providing a 
strong financial incentive for states to reduce the number of people 
claiming TANF.123 
In an effort to set a floor below which no state could reduce its funding 
of TANF, Congress prohibited states from reducing the amount they spent 
on TANF by more than 25% of what they spent in 1994.124 This 
requirement is referred to as the “Maintenance-of-Effort” (MOE) 
requirement—75% of what states spent in 1994 on cash, emergency 
assistance, job training, and child care spending connected to welfare 
programs.125 If states fail to meet the MOE requirements, the federal 
government will reduce that state’s subsequent annual block grant by $1 
for every $1 of the state’s shortfall. The MOE requirement increases to 
80% if states fail to meet work participation standards.126 
States have to meet these federally-imposed TANF work participation 
standards not only to keep their MOE requirement at 75% of 1994 
spending levels, but to continue receiving their block grant.127 These 
standards require that at least half of all families and nine out of ten two-
parent families must be “engaged in work”.128 However, these standards 
are reduced if the state either reduces its caseload or spends more than the 
federal government requires under its MOE requirements.129 As a result, 
caseload reduction and additional spending can lower the state’s effective 
participation rate.130 
                                                     
122. See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44188, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 
FAMILIES (TANF): FINANCING ISSUES 2–3 (2015) (detailing how the TANF “block grant reflects peak 
spending for each state during the FY1992 to FY1995 period in TANF’s predecessor programs”). 
123. See Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families in the Child 
Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REV. 386, 394 (2002) (describing how “PRWORA dramatically alters the 
way that states dispense public assistance to the poor” because it “offers financial bounties for states 
that are able to reduce the number of families on welfare” (citation omitted)); cf. Candice Hoke, State 
Discretion Under New Federal Welfare Legislation: Illusion, Reality and a Federalism-Based 
Constitutional Challenge, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 115, 116 (1998). 
124. See Wiseman, supra note 41, at 36. 
125. See FALK, supra note 122, at 9. 
126. See id. 
127. Id.  
128. See HEATHER HAHN, DAVID KASSABIAN & SHEILA ZEDLEWSKI, URBAN INST., TANF WORK 
REQUIREMENTS AND STATE STRATEGIES TO FULFILL THEM 1 (2012), https://www.urban.org/ 
sites/default/files/publication/25376/412563-TANF-Work-Requirements-and-State-Strategies-to-
Fulfill-Them.PDF [https://perma.cc/25YK-9XPU].   
129. 45 C.F.R. § 261.43 (1999). 
130. Actual penalties can be lowered for a variety of reasons including an economic downturn in 
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States allocated less and less spending to welfare programs over the 
twenty years before PRWORA.131 In the early years of TANF, large 
caseload reductions helped states meet their rates and freed up TANF 
funds for broader support for low-income families. Some states have 
broadened the definition of work, while other states have restricted it.132 
Because the block grant has gone unchanged since Congress passed 
PRWORA, the TANF block grant is lower, adjusting for inflation and in 
nominal terms, than when Congress created the block grant in 1996.133 
The TANF block grant not only freezes the amount of relief available 
to families; its formula locks in expenditure inequalities among states. 
Because the formula is based on a state’s highest annual expenditures on 
AFDC in the three years preceding PRWORA, those states that spent 
comparatively less on AFDC than its neighbors receive comparatively 
less federal funding for TANF. The purpose of taking the highest of the 
three previous annual expenditures was to prevent states from slashing 
expenditures significantly in the first years of TANF, but it locked in 
cross-state disparities. For instance, Arkansas received federal funding for 
TANF equal to $500 per child per year, whereas the District of Columbia 
received TANF funds per poor child more than ten times that amount.134 
Aware that they were locking this interstate inequality into the statute, 
Congress created a supplemental grant for seventeen states that were 
disadvantaged by the block grant formula.135 At the time of PRWORA’s 
passage, one of the proponents of this Supplemental Grant argued on the 
Senate floor that the purpose of this Supplemental Grant was “to chip 
away at historical inequities between States due to the Federal 
Government’s present system of awarding AFDC moneys.”136 Initially, 
                                                     
that particular area or because of a natural disaster. A state that does not meet the TANF work 
participation standard is penalized by a 5% reduction in the block grant in the first year, which is 
increased for each subsequent year by 2%, not to exceed 21%. LADONNA PAVETTI, BROOKINGS INST., 
THE CHALLENGE OF ACHIEVING HIGH WORK PARTICIPATION RATES IN WELFARE PROGRAMS (2004), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-challenge-of-achieving-high-work-participation-rates-in-
welfare-programs/ [https://perma.cc/N6XG-TJR2]. 
131. See generally Paul E. Peterson, Devolution’s Price, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111 (1996). 
132. See Joel F. Handler, Welfare-to-Work: Reform or Rhetoric, 50 ADMIN. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1998) 
(characterizing “[s]tate authority over AFDC” as “greatly extended by converting the federal 
entitlement into block grants” (citation omitted)); Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 
1131, 1152–66 (2005). 
133. See generally SCHOTT, PAVETTI & FINCH, supra note 56.  
134. See generally SEITH, supra note 4. 
135. See also “Rainy Day” and Other Special TANF Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Res. of the Comm. on Ways and Means H. of Rep., 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Rainy 
Day]. 
136. 141 CONG. REC. S13,200 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1995) (statement of Sen. Mack). 
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Congress increased the TANF block grant to these seventeen states 
through the Supplemental Grant by a rate of 2.5% annually.137 In 2001, 
Congress stopped those annual increases and froze the Supplemental 
Grant.138 As a result, Supplemental Grant states continued to receive less 
than 50% of the federal TANF funds per poor child than the other 33 
states: “in 2009 . . . these states received $712 per poor child ($643 in 
block grant funds and $69 in Supplemental Grants), compared to $1,436 
per poor child in other states.”139 
In 2011, Congress abandoned this commitment to reducing state 
disparities by eliminating the Supplemental Block Grant it had provided 
to these seventeen states, slashing $108 million in annual TANF funds.140 
Congress did this at a time when fourteen of those states faced budget 
shortfalls amounting to $24 billion (as much as 37% of their budgets).141 
The child poverty rate in the Supplemental Grant states averaged 22.4% 
in 2009, 4.3% higher than the average for the other states and 2.7% higher 
than the national averages.142 Four of the five states with the highest rates 
of child poverty lost their Supplemental Grants. As a result, TANF’s 
funding formula guarantees that states that failed to invest in poor families 
over a three-year period in the mid-nineties are now locked into that 
spending period indefinitely.143 
D. Diverting the Block Grant to Fill Budget Holes 
Due to its devolutionary design, TANF transformed federal cash 
assistance funding from “a specific funding source for cash assistance” 
into “a broad funding stream for various programs supporting low-income 
families.”144 States, all but one of which are prohibited by their own 
                                                     
137. GREEN BOOK, supra note 62, at 7–19. 
138. SEITH, supra note 4. 
139. LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EXPIRATION OF TANF 
SUPPLEMENTAL GRANTS A FURTHER SIGN OF WEAKENING FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR WELFARE 
REFORM 4 (2011), https://www.cbpp.org/research/expiration-of-tanf-supplemental-grants-a-further-
sign-of-weakening-federal-support-for [https://perma.cc/UL58-VSJ9]. 
140. See id. at 7. 
141. See id. at 5. 
142. See id. at 3. 
143.  SCHOTT, PAVETTI & FINCH, supra note 56, at 4 (“The Supplemental Grants were designed to 
lessen the resulting inequities and problems. Now, however, nothing in TANF does.”). 
144.  HEATHER HAHN, OLIVIA GOLDEN & ALEXANDRA STANCZYK, URBAN INST., STATE 
APPROACHES TO THE TANF BLOCK GRANT: WELFARE IS NOT WHAT YOU THINK IT IS, at v (2012), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412635-State-Approaches-to-the-TANF-Block-Grant.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/58NM-TC48] (examining state policies in five states).  
05 - Hammond.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/18/2017  8:39 AM 
2017] WELFARE AND FEDERALISM’S PERIL 1745 
 
constitutions to run deficits, face significant annual budget pressures.145 
In addition to those self-imposed constitutional constraints, some states 
have been sued to allocate additional resources to other areas, including 
child welfare.146 As a result, the TANF block grant has become a tempting 
source of general revenue for states.147 The transfer of the TANF block 
grant to fund foster care services is particularly prevalent: TANF “makes 
up about 19 percent of federal spending on child welfare services.”148 This 
national rate of moving nearly one in five federal dollars of TANF funding 
to foster services masks even greater transfers in individual states: Texas 
reportedly “devot[es] more than half the state’s TANF and MOE spending 
to child welfare” and Michigan uses “close to 40 percent” of its TANF 
grant to fund foster services.149 According to a Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Report, thirty-one states reported spending 
TANF funds on child welfare services in 2011.150 States are also under 
increasing pressure to pay for health care services despite drops in 
                                                     
145.  Bagley, supra note 39, at 9–10 (“With the exception of Vermont, the states are legally obliged 
to balance their budgets every year.”); see also Freeman & Rogers, supra note 13, at 218 (noting “the 
near absence of redistributive fiscal federalism in the United States” due to “state constitutional bars 
on deficit spending” and “the relative efficiency of American capital markets in disciplining state 
borrowing”). 
146.  John O’Toole & Leecia Welch, Litigation Leads to Sustainable Reform: A Case Study of 
Utah’s Success, in CTR. FOR STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, FOR THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN: LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM CLASS ACTIONS LITIGATION  97–123 (2012), https://www.cssp.org/publications/ 
child-welfare/class-action-reform/For-the-Welfare-of-Children_Lessons-Learned-from-Class-
Action-Litigation_January-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6JR-DULG]. 
147.  GORDON B. MERMIN & C. EUGENE STEUERLE, URBAN INST.,  THE IMPACT OF TANF ON 
STATE BUDGETS 3 (1997), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/impact-tanf-state-budgets 
[https://perma.cc/UAD4-82N2] (explaining that various fiscal pressures “will encourage states to shift 
any TANF saving toward other functions” and that “TANF itself provides incentives to reduce welfare 
spending relative to former welfare law because of the switch from matching to block grants” because 
states “must bear the full cost of additional spending”); HAHN ET AL., supra note 144, at vii 
(concluding that “[a] major theme of state spending on TANF is that resources are transferred to other 
programs” such as services for foster youth); see also Kimberly J. Morgan, Constricting the Welfare 
State: Tax Policy and the Political Movement Against Government, in REMAKING AMERICA, supra 
note 13, at 27 (arguing that “[t]he redistributive programs of the welfare state cannot exist without a 
politically secure and stable source of finance”). 
148.  HAHN ET AL., supra note 144, at vii; see also Welfare Reform, supra note 112, at 18 (statement 
of Gordon L. Berlin, President of MDRC) (TANF appears to have “become a form of revenue-sharing 
for the states”).  
149. HAHN ET AL., supra note 144, at vii (“[T]he transfer of TANF funds to child welfare is a way 
to solve state budgetary issues and does not imply any policy connection between the two 
programs.”); see also Susan Vivian Mangold & Catherine Cerulli, Follow the Money: Federal, State, 
and Local Funding Strategies for Child Welfare Services and the Impact of Local Levies on Adoptions 
in Ohio, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 349, 352 (2009). 
150. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-170, CHILD WELFARE: STATES USE 
FLEXIBLE FUNDS, BUT STRUGGLE TO MEET SERVICE NEEDS (2013).  
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revenue.151 
For these reasons, less than 30% of the TANF block grant is actually 
spent on cash assistance.152 Like the 1996 funding formula of the block 
grant and the 2011 elimination of supplemental grants, the discretion 
afforded states to reappropriate TANF funds to meet other funding needs 
exacerbates inequalities in state spending and policies. As a result, TANF 
recipients “experience extraordinarily different programs in different 
states.”153 
E. Benefit Levels, Caseload Reduction, and the Rise of Extreme 
Poverty 
While the TANF block grant has exacerbated massive differences 
across states, the funding mechanism has not led to a 
generous/parsimonious state divide. Rather, the TANF block grant has 
ensured that every state’s welfare program has deteriorated. No state’s 
cash assistance program post-welfare reform has more generous benefits 
than the AFDC program pre-welfare reform.154 For a majority of TANF 
families, the purchasing power of their benefits is lower than 1996 levels 
when adjusting for inflation.155 This twenty-year deterioration is even 
more striking in the context of the large declines in benefits over the 
twenty years before PRWORA when “cash assistance benefit levels for 
poor families with children fell by more than 40 percent in real terms in 
two-thirds of the states.”156 
As a result, the poverty-fighting benefit for families who still receive 
TANF has steadily diminished over time. In 2012, no state’s TANF 
                                                     
151. See Morgan, supra note 147, at 41. 
152. See generally DeParle, supra note 111. 
153. Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the 
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 582–99 (1999) (arguing that states are less 
generous than the federal government in social welfare spending and minority groups are more likely 
to be shut out of the budgetary process); Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of 
Devolution, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 90 (2002) (“The confluence of devolution with 
the statutory ‘no entitlement’ disclaimer leaves welfare recipients more vulnerable to arbitrary and 
unchecked government action.”); HAHN ET AL., supra note 144, at v, vii (finding that of the five states 
studied the “state’s largest category of spending differs from that of the other four states”). 
154. Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg, Feminization of Poverty in the United States: Any Surprises?, 
in POOR WOMEN IN RICH COUNTRIES 239 (Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg ed., 2009) (“Benefits for 
poor families have continued to decline under TANF, falling an average of 13% in real terms from 
1994 to 2003.”). 
155. IFE FINCH & LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE VALUE OF TANF 
CASH BENEFITS CONTINUED TO ERODE IN 2012 (2013), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/ 
atoms/files/3-28-13tanf.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CRU-XUF6]. 
156. Id. 
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benefit level raised a TANF family of three to 50% of the of the federal 
poverty level (FPL).157 In a majority of states, benefits were below 30% 
FPL.158 In twenty-five states, TANF benefits amounted to less than half 
of the Fair Market Rent of a two-bedroom apartment.159 
Proponents of TANF point to the program’s caseload reduction as a 
sign of its success. They often fail to point out that TANF’s predecessor, 
AFDC, was largely a short-term benefit, too, with half of AFDC recipients 
leaving the program within one year.160 Others have admitted that TANF 
was a successful intervention for some families, particularly those in 
which the parent could take advantage of the new EITC and strong 
economic growth in the late 1990s to leave cash assistance. The evidence 
of that claim of better economic outcomes for leavers is disputed: the 
GAO estimated in 2002 that former TANF recipients earned between 
$9,500 and $15,000 annually—still below the federal poverty level.161 
Those who remain on the caseload are more at risk of deep or extreme 
poverty, defined as 50% FPL.162 
But there has been a less reported, more troubling consequence of the 
dramatic decline in states’ welfare caseloads: those families who no 
longer receive cash assistance live in even deeper poverty. In 1995, AFDC 
raised 62% of children receiving assistance out of deep poverty.163 In 
2005, TANF lifted only 21% out of deep poverty.164 The number of 
children shielded from deep poverty by TANF cash assistance dropped by 
1.6 million over that decade.165 In 2008, the Congressional Research 
Service calculated that 1.3 million families were neither working nor 
receiving TANF assistance.166 Compared to the performance of the safety 
                                                     
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Frank Munger, Beyond Welfare Reform: Can We Build a Local Welfare State?, 44 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 999, 1004 (2004) (citation omitted). 
161. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-615T, WELFARE REFORM: STATES PROVIDE 
TANF-FUNDED WORK SUPPORT SERVICES TO MANY LOW-INCOME FAMILIES WHO DO NOT RECEIVE 
CASH ASSISTANCE 5 (2002). 
162. ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SAFETY NET EFFECTIVE AT 
FIGHTING POVERTY BUT HAS WEAKENED FOR THE VERY POOREST (2009), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-6-09pov.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q2F-QH53]. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id.; see generally PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT’S HARD TO END POVERTY IN 
AMERICA, 81–100 (2012) (discussing extent of extreme poverty in the United States). 
166. ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CLASP, TANF POLICY BRIEF: CASH ASSISTANCE SINCE 
WELFARE REFORM (2011), https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2017/04/Cash 
Assistance.pdf [https://perma.cc/74HA-JD6G] (pointing out that many of these women who are 
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net across recessions, households in deep poverty suffered more in this 
recession than in past recessions because of the structure of TANF and its 
ties to employment.167 The Urban Institute calculated that “one in four 
low-income single mothers nationwide—about 1.5 million—are jobless 
and without cash aid,” twice the rate of so-called “disconnected mothers” 
pre-PRWORA.168 More than 40% experience that lack of employment or 
cash assistance for more than a year—and many of these disconnected 
mothers are disabled themselves, have disabled children, or are victims of 
domestic violence.169 The consequences for families of the tightening 
eligibility, the frozen funding of block grants, the looting of TANF funds 
for other state purposes, and the time limits is a program that fails to shield 
families from extreme poverty and leaves millions of families, particularly 
those who because of disabilities or domestic violence are especially 
vulnerable to unemployment, without any income assistance. 
III. THE LIMITS OF FISCAL DEVOLUTION AS NATIONAL 
POLICY 
The devolutionary structure of TANF has not only led to a nationwide 
decline in efforts by states to reduce poverty among needy families. 
TANF’s fiscal design also ensured that the federal government was unable 
to deploy the program to assist those families in the wake of the financial 
crisis and the Great Recession. While other features of TANF have been 
well-documented, this aspect of TANF has been studied less and has 
important implications for any conversation about federalism. In this Part, 
I show how TANF’s limited role in responding to both Hurricane Katrina 
                                                     
disconnected from work or welfare “have disabilities that limit their ability to work, but either do not 
meet the stringent definition of disability needed for SSI benefits, or are waiting for their SSI 
applications to be approved”); see also INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE CHILDREN LEFT 
BEHIND: DEEPER POVERTY, FEWER SUPPORTS (2003), https://iwpr.org/publications/the-children-
left-behind-deeper-poverty-fewer-supports/ [https://perma.cc/8FAR-V7TN]. 
167. See HEATHER HILL ET AL., MATHEMATICA, LIVING ON LITTLE: CASE STUDIES OF IOWA 
FAMILIES WITH VERY LOW INCOMES 7 (2001), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/177711 
/LiveOnLittle01.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3GD-CDMQ]; SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI ET AL., URBAN INST., 
FAMILIES COPING WITHOUT EARNINGS OR GOVERNMENT CASH ASSISTANCE (2003), 
http://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410634_OP64.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D9U-PKTM]. 
168. DeParle, supra note 111; see also REBECCA BLANK & BRIAN KOVAK, BROOKINGS INST., 
HELPING DISCONNECTED SINGLE MOTHERS (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/05_single_mothers_blank.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX4E-BLVY] (calculating that “roughly 2.2 
million women who head families do not support themselves either with welfare or with their own 
earnings[]” along with “almost 4 million children who live in these severely economically challenged 
families”). 
169. See GREGORY ACS ET AL., URBAN INST., FINAL SYNTHESIS REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM 
ASPE’S “LEAVERS” GRANTS (2001), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/final-synthesis-
report-findings-aspes-leavers-grants [https://perma.cc/XT89-7ZQD].  
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and the Great Recession sheds serious doubt about whether the federal 
government can expand a fiscally devolved program. I reinforce that 
argument by highlighting the failure of one state’s TANF program to 
respond to widespread need in the midst of the most recent economic 
downturn. Something progressive federalists often ignore is that once the 
federal government devolves authority to states, it is difficult for the 
federal government to quickly regain control of the program, particularly 
in emergencies. This logic of “devolution as statutized deterioration” has 
particularly troubling consequences when policymakers expect safety net 
programs to respond to economic downturns. 
A. The TANF Block Grant, Hurricane Katrina, and the Great 
Recession 
In responding to the financial crisis of 2008 and the recession that 
followed, the federal government’s stimulus efforts reveal the limits of a 
fiscal federalist program like TANF during times of national emergency 
and widespread need. The federal government had three primary 
strategies in its safety net response to the recession, two of which are 
found in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)170 and 
the third of which was a regulatory attempt to revive a waiver program. 
All three of these efforts by the federal government highlight the TANF 
block grant’s incapacity for national expansion and innovation. First, the 
Obama Administration failed to expand or reform the TANF block 
grant—instead relying on other safety net programs like SNAP to increase 
assistance to low-income families. Second, the Administration and 
Congressional allies, drawing on lessons from Hurricane Katrina, created 
a separate TANF Emergency Fund to encourage state expansion and avoid 
the block grant restrictions. Third, the Obama Administration tried 
unsuccessfully to recruit states to apply for waivers to abandon the work 
requirements in light of widespread unemployment among low-wage 
workers. Examining these three strategies highlights the limitations of 
fiscal federalism. 
Recognition that TANF was ill-suited to serve as stimulus measure led 
the Obama Administration and Congress to rely on other safety net 
programs, like SNAP and Unemployment Insurance (UI) in ARRA. 
ARRA extended unemployment benefits through the rest of 2009 and 
increased the benefits by $25 a week, providing $40 billion for the benefits 
extension and increase.171 Through ARRA, the federal government 
                                                     
170. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
171. ALISON M. SHELTON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40368, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
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increased monthly SNAP benefits by 13.6% in April 2009 and rescinded 
time limits for adults without dependent children, allocating $19.9 billion 
for the expansion of SNAP.172 In addition to their countercyclical effect, 
these two programs could help poor families—SNAP especially. With 
SNAP’s means-test, the Obama Administration and its allies in Congress 
knew that any expansion in SNAP would aid families during the deepest 
crisis of the American economy since the Great Depression.173 These two 
appropriations, while large, were still smaller than ARRA’s $87.1 billion 
Medicaid expansion.174 
In contrast, what was TANF’s role in the Obama Administration’s 
stimulus strategy? A $5 billion fund to which states could apply.175 There 
was no similar expansion in TANF benefit levels, eligibility criteria, or 
time limits. Without overhauling PRWORA, the federal government 
could not expand TANF in the ways that it had Medicaid, SNAP, and UI. 
Instead, it needed to rely on the states to access the funds and use them 
effectively. 
The structure of the TANF block grant prevented the Obama 
Administration from expanding TANF nationwide in the face of the 
recession.176 The 2008 recession was not the first time the government 
recognized TANF’s deficiency as a strand of the countercyclical safety 
net. There were similar concerns with the 2005 recession.177 Congress had 
                                                     
PROVISIONS IN THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 (2009). 
172. BRYNNE KEITHE-JENNINGS & DOTTIE ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, 
SNAP BENEFIT BOOST IN 2009 RECOVERY ACT PROVIDED ECONOMIC STIMULUS AND REDUCED 
HARDSHIP (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-benefit-boost-in-2009-
recovery-act-provided-economic-stimulus-and [https://perma.cc/W69E-TBU7]. 
173. MARK NORD & MARK PRELL, USDA ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ERR-116, FOOD SECURITY 
IMPROVED FOLLOWING THE 2009 ARRA INCREASE IN SNAP BENEFITS (2011). 
174. Farhana Hossain, Amanda Cox, John Mcgrath & Stephan Weitberg, The Stimulus Plan: How 
to Spend $787 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
projects/44th_president/stimulus [https://perma.cc/9P3N-X687].  
175. Background Information about the TANF Emergency Fund, OFF. FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 8, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/ 
background-information-about-the-tanf-emergency-fund [https://perma.cc/NU49-XP3U].  
176. Rethinking Welfare in the Great Recession: Issues in the Reauthorization of Temporary Aid 
to Needy Families: Before the S. Fin. Comm., 111th Cong. 11 (2010) [hereinafter Rethinking Welfare] 
(statement of Gordon L. Berlin, President of MDRC) (explaining how “an inflation-adjusted decline 
in funding, lack of reporting and thus accountability, strict and unmeetable [sic] participation 
standards, and MOE flexibility — may have combined to undermine the block grant’s ability to play 
a countercyclical role when the recession hit”). 
177. Super, supra note 112, at 395 n.10 (pointing out that PRWORA’s “shift of financial 
responsibility” to the states “effectively prevent[ed] the cash assistance rolls from expanding to meet 
increased need in a recession for the first time since the Great Depression”). 
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created a TANF contingency fund, but states failed to qualify for it.178 
That was not surprising to anti-poverty advocates because, to access the 
contingency fund, states needed to match federal funds 100%. 
When Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast in 2005 and 
exposed the extent of deep poverty in the region, the federal government 
struggled to coordinate recovery efforts with state and local 
governments.179 In the area of welfare, Congress could not compel the 
Gulf Coast states to increase TANF benefits or soften restrictive eligibility 
requirements.180 Louisiana and Mississippi had notoriously parsimonious 
TANF programs; Louisiana’s average monthly benefit consistently 
ranked as the lowest in the nation.181 Even if the states’ programs had been 
more generous in terms of benefit levels, the number of families 
connected to TANF had dwindled. Like elsewhere in the U.S., fewer than 
one in five poor children on the Gulf Coast were receiving cash 
assistance.182 
In an echo of the disaster relief that predated and presaged the New 
Deal’s expansion of the welfare state, Congress enacted the TANF 
Emergency Response and Recovery Act of 2005.183 The 2005 statute 
altered several default funding rules and restrictions for the affected states, 
creating a separate TANF emergency fund regime and waiving the block 
grant requirements as applied to the federal TANF contingency fund.184 
While the statute did not provide additional funding, it transformed 20% 
of the original block grants to Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi into 
                                                     
178. Rainy Day, supra note 135, at 30–35 (statement of Harry J. Holzer, Georgetown University) 
(explaining why states consistently failed to qualify for contingency funds). 
179. Pamela Winston et al., Federalism After Hurricane Katrina: How Can Social Programs 
Respond to a Major Disaster?, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1239 (2007) (“[I]f demand on TANF programs 
increases rapidly, states have limited ability to expand coverage. The block grant allotments are 
essentially frozen in time, unless changed legislatively.”). 
180. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 522 (2007) (describing the problems that 
“proceeded from unprecedented confusion among federal, state, and local responders regarding the 
allocation of their roles and responsibilities, and how to proceed in the face of this uncertainty”).  
181. Winston et al., supra note 179, at 1238 (documenting that “[b]ecause Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and the other Gulf states typically provide among the lowest benefits in the nation, current block 
grants reflect the states’ historically low benefit levels” (citations omitted)). 
182. Id. at 1239 (“Prior to Katrina, about 85% of poor Louisiana families and 82% of poor 
Mississippi families did not receive TANF cash benefits.”). 
183. See MICHELLE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE WELFARE STATE 14–16 (2012). 
184. TANF Emergency Response and Recovery Act Of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-68, 119 Stat. 2003 
(2005). 
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loans by waiving any penalty for nonpayment.185 Any state could also 
qualify for 100% reimbursement from the TANF contingency fund for 
payments for non-recurring short-term cash benefits to any evacuee 
family who had been living in an affected area.186 By freeing up the 
restrictions to accessing the loan and contingency funds, the federal 
government offered the Gulf Coast states, as well as states taking in 
evacuees, the chance to draw down federal funds to provide cash 
assistance.187 But TANF’s block grant structure limited long-term 
expansion of assistance to needy families affected by Hurricane Karina.188 
States could only use the contingency fund for short-term, one-time aid to 
families with children who were not already receiving TANF.189 
With ARRA in 2009, the federal government essentially nationalized 
the post-Katrina TANF emergency efforts. Congress created, as part of 
ARRA, the TANF Emergency Contingency Fund or “Emergency 
Fund.”190 Funded at $5 billion, the TANF Emergency Fund allowed states 
to submit applications to use some of those funds for any or all of three 
purposes: basic assistance, short-term, one-time benefits (similar to the 
2005 Katrina efforts), and subsidized employment.191 To draw down from 
the TANF Emergency Fund, states needed to qualify for each category of 
funding separately.192 The legislation imposed a cap on what states could 
draw from the Emergency Fund and the regular contingency fund: over a 
                                                     
185. Id. 
186. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22246, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): 
ITS ROLE IN RESPONSE TO THE EFFECTS OF HURRICANE KATRINA (2007). 
187. Winston et al., supra note 179, at 1260 (2007). 
188. Id. at 1257 (“The scale of the states’ short-term and long-term need to provide TANF cash 
assistance to Katrina victims is still unclear, however, leaving open the possibility that the fixed block 
grant structure may pose problems in the future, especially with Louisiana’s deteriorated fiscal 
condition.”). 
189. MARK GREENBERG, CLASP, NEW TANF LAW PROVIDES ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR KATRINA 
RELIEF: KEY IMPROVEMENTS STILL NEEDED 2 (2005), http://www.clasp.org/publications/ 
new_tanf_bill_and_katrina_relief_cj2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L29-W44L]; see also Winston et al., 
supra note 179, at 1259.  
190. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2101, 123 Stat. 115, 
446 (2009). The statute labeled the TANF fund as “the Emergency Contingency Fund,” but in 
subsequent agency guidance including the Policy Announcement, Health and Human Services 
referred to it as the Emergency Fund, to avoid confusion with the original Contingency Fund 
discussed above. 
191. Bach, supra note 113, at 296; see also Peter Edelman & Barbara Ehrenreich, Why Welfare 
Reform Has Failed, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/04/AR2009120402604.html [https://perma.cc/U3GY-VTBJ].  
192. OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL TANF 
CONTINGENCY FUNDS (2008), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/policy/pi-
ofa/2008/200804/pi200804 [https://perma.cc/JGV4-PWW3]. 
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two-year period after the enactment of ARRA, a state could draw up to 
50% of its basic block grant from the two funds.193 States could use the 
Emergency Fund to cover 80% of their increased costs in any of the three 
categories.194 Functionally, states had a 4:1 match on any funds it used on 
basic assistance, one-time short-term assistance, and subsidized 
employment. 
The TANF Emergency Fund was relatively small compared to the 
other, aforementioned anti-poverty efforts in ARRA. While not enacting 
a subsidized jobs program the size of earlier efforts from the 1930s, 1960s, 
or 1970s, the TANF Emergency Fund did place a quarter million low-
income individuals in subsidized jobs over a period of less than two 
years.195 A majority of states created subsidized jobs programs for adults, 
but other states used the Emergency Fund to start programs that targeted 
non-TANF families, instead providing transitional jobs in summer or 
year-round programs for young people aged twenty-four and under.196 
Other states, including many of the states who had historically meager 
TANF programs, did not create any subsidized employment programs. 
As a result, the TANF Emergency Fund was the opposite of targeted 
social policy. Instead, the appropriation exacerbated state inequalities. 
States had to apply. A lot of states and municipalities were confused by 
the process.197 There was little coordination between state and local 
policymakers, and the process benefited those states and localities that 
were typically successful at drawing down federal funds. Most 
importantly, the TANF Emergency Fund did nothing to reform the TANF 
block grant or the nearly $30 billion states expend under the MOE 
requirements.198 Because of states’ use of TANF funds in previous years, 
states failed to successfully deploy TANF to combat poverty in the wake 
                                                     
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CREATING SUBSIDIZED 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOW-INCOME PARENTS: THE LEGACY OF THE TANF 
EMERGENCY FUND (2011), https://www.cbpp.org/research/creating-subsidized-employment-
opportunities-for-low-income-parents [https://perma.cc/FCC8-D3VU]. 
196. Id. 
197. LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE TANF 
EMERGENCY FUND CREATED BY THE FEDERAL RECOVERY ACT (2009), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/opportunities-under-the-tanf-emergency-fund-created-by-the-
federal-recovery-act [https://perma.cc/UBX2-9X8Z]. 
198. Id.  
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of the Great Recession.199 The fund was exhausted by December 2010.200 
With the supplemental grants and the Emergency Fund gone, Congress 
now provides no additional TANF funding to help states respond to the 
increase in need stemming from an economic downturn or to address the 
inequities resulting from the funding formula of the TANF block grant. 
In addition to relying on other programs like SNAP and UI at the 
expense of TANF, as well as creating a separate emergency fund to avoid 
the restrictionist block grant, the Obama Administration attempted to 
relieve states of the work participation rates described above through a 
new waiver program.201 Just as the waivers from the 1980s and early 
1990s enabled states under AFDC to experiment with different policies 
before the passage of PRWORA, the Obama Administration offered states 
the opportunity, albeit without additional funds, to expand services. The 
waiver program allowed states that undertake alternative welfare-to-work 
strategies to substitute other performance measures for the TANF 
statutory work participation standards. While the waiver programs would 
need to be formally evaluated to receive federal funding, the programs 
would allow states to count “pre-employment activities such as education, 
rehabilitative activities, and job search[es]” toward the work standards.202 
The waivers would also give the states flexibility to experiment with the 
state’s entire TANF caseload or a specific population, as well as flexibility 
to conduct state-wide changes or demonstration projects in certain areas 
of the state. HHS announced that the typical waiver would last five 
years.203 
Unfortunately, this waiver program, although permitting states to 
provide additional cash assistance to hard-to-employ adults, once again 
risked exacerbating state inequalities. As with the Emergency Fund, the 
federal government had to rely on states to opt-in to this programmatic 
                                                     
199. SCHOTT, PAVETTI & FINCH, supra note 56, at 2 (describing how “facing budget shortfalls, 
many states cut already-low TANF benefit amounts further, shortened TANF time limits, or took 
other actions to shrink caseloads or keep them from rising much in the face of mounting need”). 
200. GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41078, THE TANF EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY 
FUND 2 (2010) (describing how HHS announced the fund had been depleted by August 2010 and “no 
additional TANF funds to address the continuing effects of the recession”). 
201. GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32760, THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 
FAMILIES (TANF) BLOCK GRANT: RESPONSES TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS  3 (2016).  
202. GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42627, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 
FAMILIES: WELFARE WAIVERS (2012). 
203. Id. 
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expansion.204 Only one state applied for the waiver.205 The Obama 
Administration eventually abandoned the waiver program after intense 
opposition from House Republicans.206 
The federal government responded to the imbalances of state efforts on 
cash assistance to needy families by absolving them further of TANF 
requirements under federal law. The Obama administration’s 
unsuccessful efforts to enact the waiver program underscored the 
paradoxical effects of devolution: the only way a President can increase 
TANF’s poverty-fighting effect is to grant the states more discretion, an 
approach that hinders federal government’s ability to claw back 
programmatic control in the future. 
The federal government’s welfare strategy in response to the Great 
Recession belies TANF’s deteriorative logic. In ARRA, the federal 
government responded to the deterioration of TANF in three ways: 1) 
using other programs to reduce hardship among poor families, 2) creating 
a relatively unrestricted fund, set apart from the block grant mechanism, 
and 3) attempting to devolve even more authority to states. TANF’s 
inability to respond to the deepest economic crisis since the Great 
Depression is a lesson in the structural deficiencies of fiscal federalism: 
once budgetary discretion is given to the states, the federal government 
will not be able to reform or expand the program in a timely fashion, if 
ever. The block grant is a clumsy and crude mechanism for programmatic 
change—and a weak lever for economic stimulus. It prevents the national 
government from targeted expansion and programmatic reform.207 As 
discussed below, as currently constituted and implemented in the states, 
TANF lacks the countercyclical character of other safety net programs 
like SNAP.208 
                                                     
204. See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE 
CONCERNING WAIVER AND EXPENDITURE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 1115 (2012), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/policy/im-ofa/2012/im201203/im201203 
[https://perma.cc/9ZWF-RUTX]; David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 284 (2013) (“In recently issued guidance, the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services claims to possess the discretionary authority under the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to waive some of the provisions that set forth work 
requirements for funding recipients.”). 
205. See OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, supra note 204 (citing Minnesota’s application). 
206. Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 890 - Preserving Work Requirements for Welfare 
Programs Act of 2013, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/index.php?pid=103343 [https://perma.cc/346G-3YGW] (“Ultimately, no States formally 
applied for State waivers, deterred in part by inaccurate claims about what the policy involves.”). 
207. EDELMAN, supra note 165, at 4 (contrasting how “[s]tates get a bonus for doing outreach on 
food stamps[]” but “receive what amounts to a bonus for keeping people off the TANF rolls”). 
208. Id. at 3 (explaining how “SNAP has been a powerful antirecessionary force[]” while TANF 
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B. Connecticut as a Case Study of TANF’s Failure in the Great 
Recession 
In recessions, we expect more families to seek assistance to make ends 
meet. It is useful to examine one state’s TANF program to see how TANF 
no longer responds to increased need. Connecticut’s TANF program, Jobs 
First, should have exhibited greater countercyclical growth, just like 
SNAP.209 Yet, Jobs First did not respond to increased need during the 
Great Recession. While it is difficult to determine what accounts for Jobs 
First’s unresponsiveness to the most recent recession, one of the more 
stringent aspects of the program is a likely suspect: the twenty-one-month 
lifetime limit. 
Connecticut has the shortest state-imposed time limit on cash assistance 
benefits in the nation: twenty-one months.210 This time limit is 
significantly shorter than most states. Indeed, the modal time limit 
imposed by states is the federal statutory lifetime limit of sixty months.211 
In December 2007, 91,071 people were unemployed in Connecticut.212 
Two years later, that number had nearly doubled.213 In 2008, 9.4% of 
Connecticut residents (320,554) had incomes under the Federal Poverty 
                                                     
“barely moved”). 
209. Benjamin Landy, Graph: Balancing the Budget on the Backs of the Poor, CENTURY FOUND. 
(Apr. 12, 2012), http://tcf.org/blog/detail/graph-balancing-the-budget-on-the-backs-of-the-poor 
[https://perma.cc/WKV8-G74P] (describing how “‘[r]eformed’ welfare—unlike the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or food stamps—had lost its critical counter-cyclical 
function”). 
210. DAVID KASSABIAN ET. AL., URBAN INST., THE WELFARE RULES DATABOOK: STATE TANF 
POLICIES AS OF JULY 2010, at 146 tbl.IV.C.1 (2010), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/ 
welfare-rules-databook-state-tanf-policies-july-2010 [https://perma.cc/K9D3-R685]; see also LYNNE 
FENDER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LINKING STATE TANF AND RELATED 
POLICIES TO OUTCOMES: PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGIES AND ANALYSIS (2002), http://www.urban.org/ 
UploadedPDF/410607_Linking_State_TANF_Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2E2-5K4H]; see 
generally Emily Bazelon & Tamara Watts, Welfare Time Limits on the Ground: An Empirical Study 
of Connecticut’s Jobs First Program, 32 CONN. L. REV. 717, 720–21 (2000) (analyzing data and 
discussing implications of experiences of Jobs First recipients).  
211. KASSABIAN ET. AL., supra note 210, at 146 tbl.IV.C.1. 
212. LADONNA PAVETTI ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, TANF RESPONDED 
UNEVENLY TO INCREASE IN NEED DURING DOWNTURN (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-25-
11tanf.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VGS-LTWQ]. CBPP’s unemployment data afford easier cross-state 
comparisons, but the Connecticut Department of Labor statistics are available at the Department’s 
website. The definition of unemployment, of course, does not represent the sum total of adults in 
Connecticut who are out of work, but only those who are unemployed and seeking employment. The 
unemployment figures exclude discouraged workers and the involuntarily underemployed.  
213. Id. at 14 (the number of Connecticut residents who were unemployed had risen to 165,861 by 
2009—an increase of 82.1%). 
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Level, up from 7.9% in 2007.214 Indeed the estimated increase by the 
American Community Survey for Connecticut’s poverty rate from 2007 
to 2008 was the largest statistically significant increase of any state in the 
U.S. during that year.215 Despite this massive economic downturn, the 
number of families enrolled in Jobs First, Connecticut’s cash assistance 
program under the TANF block grant, barely budged. According to the 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, over the same two-year period, 
Jobs First caseloads increased by a mere 4.6% (from 18,736 to 19,595).216 
Some might suggest that in spite of the sharp decrease in jobs and the 
sharp increase of poverty in the state, there might have been other reasons 
why more families did not enroll in Jobs First during the worst economic 
downturn since the Great Recession. First, many of Connecticut’s 
unemployed were ineligible for Jobs First because their income and assets 
were too high for the means-tested program.217 Still, those who would 
likely have been eligible for Jobs First because of their low levels of 
income were more likely to be unemployed during this recession, as the 
downturn led to increased rates of unemployment for less-skilled workers 
as compared to those who had some form of higher education.218 Second, 
other families might have exhausted their lifetime limit for Jobs First. 
Perhaps others did not want to rely on the state’s safety net. Finally, adult 
cash assistance recipients are overwhelmingly female and the recession 
disproportionately affected men.219 
Nonetheless, Connecticut’s SNAP program did see a dramatic increase 
in caseloads during the same period. During the two years discussed 
                                                     
214. News Release, Conn. Voices for Children, Poverty Increase in Connecticut Was Largest in 
Nation, Census Data Show (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.ctvoices.org/sites/default/files/ 
econ09censuspovertyrelease_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6WL-3L7Q]. 
215.  ALEMAYEHU BISHAW, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POVERTY: 2009 AND 2010, AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QZX5-RB5Y]; News Release, Conn. Voices for Children, supra note 214. 
216. PAVETTI ET AL., supra note 212, at 13 tbl.B1, 16 tbl.B4. See generally LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM 
REVIEW & INVESTIGATIONS COMM., CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, CONNECTICUT’S WELFARE REFORM 
INITIATIVE 15 (2006) (showing trends in caseloads since Connecticut’s AFDC waiver reforms and 
implementation of PRWORA). 
217. Connecticut: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Cash Assistance, NAT’L CTR. 
FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, http://www.nccp.org/profiles/CT_profile_36.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J2UZ-DY2S].  
218. Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, What Is Happening to America’s Less-Skilled 
Workers? The Importance of Education and Training in Today’s Economy, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 
2, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1202_jobs_greenstone_looney.aspx  
[https://perma.cc/LGB3-L7CD]. 
219. Catherine Rampell, As Layoffs Surge, Women May Pass Men in Job Force, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
5, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/06/business/06women.html [https://perma.cc/PF2D-
Y9YF]. 
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above, food stamps caseloads in Connecticut increased from 117,550 to 
170,340, or 44.9%—nearly 10 times the increase of Jobs First.220 Reasons 
for this discrepancy might be that cash assistance is arguably more 
stigmatizing to receive than food stamps, or the more aggressive SNAP 
outreach relative to cash assistance.221 
Another explanation for this tenfold increase is different eligibility 
requirements for the two benefits. For families without an elderly or 
disabled member of the household, SNAP has essentially one eligibility 
requirement: an income limit.222 That limit is 185% of the federal poverty 
line, e.g. $2,823 monthly for a family of three.223 Eligibility requirements 
are different for households with an elderly member or someone receiving 
disability income.224 
Jobs First has stricter eligibility guidelines.225 To be eligible for the 
Jobs First Employment Services (JFES), families must, after meeting the 
initial means test, attend two orientation and needs assessment meetings 
with caseworkers and then pass the Combined Incomes Test and the 
Benefits Test.226 Furthermore, like a handful of other states, Connecticut’s 
cash assistance program has two tracks for recipients, one track for those 
who are exempted from the time limits and other requirements and 
another track for those who are not. As will be discussed below, this two-
track system might explain why Jobs First caseloads did not increase 
significantly during the recession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
220. PAVETTI ET AL., supra note 212. 
221. See Jason DeParle & Robert Gebeloff, Food Stamp Use Soars, and Stigma Fades, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/us/29foodstamps.html [https://perma.cc/G9 
N2-2P44]. 
222. SNAP Special Rules for the Elderly or Disabled, USDA, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/ 
snap-special-rules-elderly-or-disabled [https://perma.cc/J75A-3QLT].  
223. Id.  
224. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, CT.GOV., http://www.portal.ct.gov/DSS/SNAP/ 
Supplemental-Nutrition-Assistance-Program---SNAP/Eligibility [https://perma.cc/K7BR-2BKD]. 
225. See generally CONN. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., TANF CASELOAD REDUCTION REPORT FOR 
FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 4 (2016) (“The eligibility and policies regarding [Jobs First] have not 
been modified since 10/1/06.”). 
226. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW & INVESTIGATIONS COMM., supra note 216, at 35. 
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Table 1: 
Increases in Unemployment, Cash Assistance Caseloads, and SNAP 
Caseloads from December 2007 to December 2009 
 
 United States Connecticut 
Unemployment  7,600,627 (+102.7%) 74,790 (+82.1%) 
JF/TFA caseload 234,832 (+13.4%) 859 (+4.6%) 
SNAP caseload 5,566,506 (+45.3%) 52,790 (+44.9%) 
 
To be sure, the divergent responses to the recession by these two safety 
net programs are not unique to Connecticut. SNAP was more responsive 
to the recession than cash assistance was in every state.227 Yet, a closer 
look at the data reveals that Jobs First was particularly unresponsive 
relative to the nationwide trend and to the corresponding programs in 
neighboring states. The national increase in TANF caseloads was 13.4%, 
nearly three times the increase in Connecticut.228 Thirty-nine states, 
including every state in New England except Rhode Island, saw greater 
caseload increases in their cash assistance programs than Connecticut 
did.229 By contrast, the increase in SNAP recipients in Connecticut tracked 
almost exactly to the national trend: 44.9% compared to 45.3%.230 
Although Jobs First has the shortest state-imposed time limit among 
the fifty states and D.C., Connecticut softens this harsh rule somewhat by 
exempting from the time limit families whom caseworkers have deemed 
unemployable under certain conditions,231 and allowing non-exempt 
                                                     
227. PAVETTI ET AL., supra note 212. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-112(b) (2010) (listing seven exemptions: “(1) A family with a needy 
caretaker relative who is incapacitated or of an advanced age, as defined by the commissioner, if there 
is no other nonexempt caretaker relative in the household; (2) a family with a needy caretaker relative 
who is needed in the home because of the incapacity of another member of the household, if there is 
no other nonexempt caretaker relative in the household; (3) a family with a caretaker relative who is 
not legally responsible for the dependent children in the household if such relative’s needs are not 
considered in calculating the amount of the benefit and there is no other nonexempt caretaker relative 
in the household; (4) a family with a caretaker relative caring for a child who is under one year of age 
and who was born not more than ten months after the family’s enrollment if there is no other 
nonexempt caretaker relative in the household; (5) a family with a pregnant or postpartum caretaker 
relative if a physician has indicated that such relative is unable to work and there is no other 
nonexempt caretaker relative in the household; (6) a family with a caretaker relative determined by 
the commissioner to be unemployable and there is no other nonexempt caretaker relative in the 
household; and (7) minor parents attending and satisfactorily completing high school or high school 
equivalency programs”). 
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recipients to file for two six-month extensions. In 2003, it became much 
more difficult to gain more than two extensions when the legislature 
adopted stricter criteria. Non-exempt families can request two six-month 
extensions. Extensions are granted to an individual: 
[W]ho has made a good faith effort to comply with the 
requirements of the program and despite such effort has a total 
family income at a level below the payment standard, or has 
encountered circumstances preventing employment including, 
but not limited to (1) [d]omestic violence or physical harm to such 
family’s children; or (2) other circumstances beyond such 
family’s control.232  
The Department of Social Services may grant a subsequent six-month 
extensions if each adult in the family meets at least one of the following 
criteria: 
[1)] [T]he adult cannot work because of domestic violence or 
another reason beyond the adult’s control; [2)] the adult has two 
or more substantiated barriers to employment; [3)] the adult is 
working thirty-five or more hours per week, is earning at least the 
minimum wage and continues to earn less than the family’s 
temporary family assistance payment standard; or [4)] the adult is 
employed and works less than thirty-five hours per week due to 
(i) a documented medical impairment that limits the adult’s hours 
of employment, provided the adult works the maximum number 
of hours that the medical condition permits, or (ii) the need to care 
for a disabled member of the adult’s household, provided the 
adult works the maximum number of hours the adult’s caregiving 
responsibilities permit.233 
However, over a seven-year period, fewer and fewer Jobs First 
recipients received more than two extensions: “[t]he number of clients 
who were on the program for 27 or more months has decreased 
dramatically from a high of 5,040 in 1999 to 873 in 2006 (i.e., the 21-
month initial period plus at least one six month extension).”234 
As the Connecticut General Assembly noted: 
[C]aseloads have shrunk significantly since the advent of welfare 
reform. Because the time-limited cases are much more likely to 
be removed from the caseload, since [Fiscal Year 2001] the 
number of exempt cases has either equaled or exceeded those that 
are time-limited. As of June 2006, there were 7,555 cases that 
                                                     
232. Id. § 17b-112(c). 
233. Id. 
234. See LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW & INVESTIGATIONS COMM., supra note 216, at 11. 
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were time-limited and 12,305 exempt.235 
This two-track system might explain why Jobs First caseloads did not 
increase as dramatically as SNAP caseloads in Connecticut. If the 
majority of Jobs First cases are exempt, either because the adult is not 
included in the assistance unit or is deemed unemployable by the state, 
then we might expect the program to be immune to changes in the 
employment rate. 
Very few states have evaluated their cash assistance programs using 
econometric, let alone experimental, methods. Connecticut is an 
exception. Once Connecticut implemented these requirements, the state’s 
Department of Social Services contracted the Manpower Development 
Research Corporation (MDRC) to conduct a large-scale evaluation of 
Jobs First, randomly assigning welfare applicants and recipients in two 
offices to program and control groups from January 1996 to February 
1997 and collecting data on these individuals for four years.236 However, 
this study concluded just as the state instituted new criteria for additional 
extensions. 
This detailed, longitudinal evaluation showed that while Jobs First has 
progressive aspects, such as a generous earnings disregard,237 the program 
did not generate broad income gains or improved outcomes for 
children.238 “Once Jobs First families began reaching the time limit, their 
                                                     
235. Id. at 5–6. 
236. DAN BLOOM ET AL., MDRC, JOBS FIRST: FINAL REPORT ON CONNECTICUT’S WELFARE 
REFORM INITIATIVE ES-1 (2002), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/ct_jobsfirst.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VUY8-JJE3] [hereinafter BLOOM ET AL., JOBS FIRST: FINAL REPORT]. For the 
interim evaluation, see the following reports: DAN BLOOM ET AL., MDRC, JOBS FIRST: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EARLY IMPACTS OF CONNECTICUT’S WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVE (2000), 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED439274.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JSZ-M88R]; DAN BLOOM ET AL., 
MDRC, CONNECTICUT POST-TIME LIMIT TRACKING STUDY: SIX- MONTH SURVEY RESULTS (1999), 
https://www.mdrc.org/publication/connecticut-post-time-limit-tracking-study [https://perma.cc/4AN 
3-L9NL]; JO ANNA HUNTER-MANNS ET AL., MDRC, CONNECTICUT POST-TIME LIMIT TRACKING 
STUDY: THREE-MONTH SURVEY RESULTS (1998), https://www.mdrc.org/publication/connecticut-
post-time-limit-tracking-study-three-month-results [https://perma.cc/FS3P-3U3Q]; LAURA MELTON 
& DAN BLOOM, MDRC, CONNECTICUT’S JOBS FIRST PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF WELFARE 
LEAVERS (2002), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED450259.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7T4-8HPK].  
237. MARY FARRELL ET AL., MDRC, WELFARE TIME LIMITS: AN UPDATE ON STATE POLICIES, 
IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS ON FAMILIES 27 (2008), https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/ 
full_609.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE3B-CF9E] (“In Connecticut, the financial incentives to work are 
unusually generous. Recipients can earn up to the federal poverty level (which was $1,431 per month 
for a family of three in 2007) and still receive the full grant amount (between $553 and $656, 
depending on the region within the state where the grant is administered). Many Connecticut staff 
recommend that recipients use the disregard, although as time limits have increasingly become a 
reality, a minority of staff said that they do encourage recipients to bank months.”). 
238. Id. 
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welfare receipt was reduced and their income gains disappeared.” 239 In 
the General Assembly report conducted by the Legislative Program 
Review and Investigation Committee (PRI), “[a]lmost half” of a sample 
of non-exempt Jobs First recipients “had no earnings in the quarter after 
they left [cash assistance].”240 
Compared to other state programs, Jobs First, along with other state 
schemes with similarly severe time-limit policies, “did not consistently 
have the largest early impacts on employment.”241 Furthermore, the 
MDRC evaluation suggested that the positive employment outcomes for 
recipients might have been a function of the strong economy at the time, 
which did not bode well for the program during an economic downturn.242 
While there were small gains for young children, the results for 
adolescents were mixed and levels of material hardship were high for 
participants in the experimental and control groups alike.243 Troubling 
facts given the social, cognitive, and health consequences for children 
living in deep poverty.244 In the MDRC study, a little more than 50% of 
the Jobs First recipients reached the time limit during the four-year survey, 
approximately two-thirds of whom were granted at least one extension 
due to unemployment or insufficient earnings.245 Many who received an 
extension left welfare in the next year or two.246 
The MDRC evaluation also suggested that Connecticut families’ 
benefits through Jobs First were particularly susceptible to termination.247 
From 2002 to 2005, with the exception of New York, which transfers its 
families into a separate state-funded general assistance program, 
Connecticut closed more cash assistance cases than any other state.248 In 
2003, Connecticut reduced the income eligibility for transitional child 
care benefits from 75% to 55% of statewide median.249 Moreover, some 
                                                     
239. BLOOM ET AL., JOBS FIRST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 236, at Key Findings. 
240. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW & INVESTIGATIONS COMM., supra note 216, at 39. 
241. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 237, at 71. 
242. BLOOM ET AL., JOBS FIRST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 236, at SUM-33 (“During the study 
period, the economy was very strong; it is not clear how program participants would have fared in an 
economy with higher unemployment rates and fewer job opportunities.”).  
243. See id. 
244. See generally Judith R. Smith et al., Consequences of Living in Poverty for Young Children’s 
Cognitive and Verbal Ability and Early School Achievement, in CONSEQUENCES OF GROWING UP 
POOR 132 (Greg J. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997). 
245. BLOOM ET AL., JOBS FIRST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 236, ch.3 at 56. 
246. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 104, at 185–86 tbl.C.5. 
247. BLOOM ET AL., JOBS FIRST: FINAL REPORT, supra note 236, at SUM-33. 
248. Id. 
249. LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW & INVESTIGATIONS COMM., supra note 216, at 6. 
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of the funds for TANF were diverted to fund foster care services.250 
Jobs First’s failure to respond to the Great Recession illustrates a 
defining feature of TANF: unlike AFDC was before or SNAP is now, 
TANF is not countercyclical. At the times when poor families are most 
likely to resort to the safety net, TANF fails to support them. Whether 
analyzing TANF’s inadequate responses to regional crises like Hurricane 
Katrina or national ones like the Great Recession, the conclusion remains 
the same: the federal government will struggle to expand an already 
devolved distributive program. The only question that remains is what 
have we learned from the twenty-year legacy of TANF. Is TANF a policy 
experiment not to be repeated? Or is it the future of the American safety 
net? 
IV. TANF: DEVOLUTIONARY OUTLIER OR WAVE OF THE 
FUTURE? 
In Part IV, I provide counterexamples of increased anti-poverty 
spending through programs that do not rely on state funds and limit state 
discretion relative to TANF, including SNAP and the EITC. I also discuss 
recent Congressional proposals to block grant other public benefit 
programs. 
A. TANF as an Outlier in the American Safety Net 
TANF’s record must be understood against the backdrop of the federal 
government’s expansion of SNAP and the EITC. Whereas states are given 
a lump sum for their cash assistance program, the federal government pays 
for states’ SNAP enrollment as the program rises and falls. The EITC, by 
contrast, is funded entirely by the federal government and administered 
through the IRS.251 
As seen above in the case of Connecticut, compared to SNAP, TANF 
provides the prima facie case that block grants lead to a deterioration of 
an anti-poverty program. SNAP has been described as the “fundamental 
                                                     
250. SHELLEY GEBALLE & JUDITH SOLOMON, CAREENING TOWARDS CRISIS: THE STATE AND 
FEDERAL FUNDING OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES IN CONNECTICUT (2004), http://www.ctvoices.org/ 
sites/default/files/welf04careensum12.pdf [https://perma.cc/C97Q-N4N2]. 
251. Some have argued that in designing the 1935 Social Security Act, the federal government 
“enacted three programs with differing federal-state divisions of authority: social security itself, 
unemployment insurance, and welfare . . . known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children.” Peter 
B. Edelman, A Conversation on Federalism and the States: The Balancing Act of Devolution, 64 ALB. 
L. REV. 1091, 1093 (2001); see also Ann Shola Orloff, The Political Origins of America’s Belated 
Welfare State, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (Margaret Weir et al. 
eds., 1988). 
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safety net in the U.S.” because “it is the only public assistance program 
that is available to all income-eligible families . . . .”252 In 2011, spending 
on SNAP amounted to $70 billion, compared to $31 billion for TANF and 
$59 billion for the federal EITC.253 That same year, nearly one in seven 
Americans were receiving SNAP, lifting approximately 4 million families 
out of poverty and 3.5 million out of deep poverty.254 Unlike TANF, the 
administration of SNAP varies little across the country, with far less 
programmatic discretion given to the states. 
One could argue that, in addition to the SNAP expansion, President 
Obama did enact an anti-poverty agenda—it’s called the Affordable Care 
Act. Both anti-poverty advocates and their critics rightly view the 
Medicaid expansion as a massive anti-poverty effort.255 But the Medicaid 
expansion reinforces, rather than undermines, the argument that TANF is 
structurally incapable of expansion. Medicaid’s funding mechanism 
allows the federal government to create a matching funds system or for 
the federal government to foot the bill.256 But with TANF, all President 
Obama could recommend is that Congress increase the block grant. Why 
would a President interested in targeting poverty do that? Considering the 
ways states have used block grants in the past for populations and 
programs that have little to no relationship to TANF, an increase in the 
size of the grant would just give states more funds to do with as they 
please. There would be no guarantee that the additional funds would go to 
families in the form of increased cash assistance or other work supports. 
Indeed, the mere expansion of block grants would not change the 
restrictionist logic of the funding formula; it would simply increase the 
financial rewards to states that reduce their caseload. Any national 
policymaker looking to reduce poverty would seek out programs like 
SNAP and UI that deliver benefits to low-income families immediately 
                                                     
252. Hilary Hoynes, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach & Douglas Almond, Long Run Impacts of 
Childhood Access to the Safety Net, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 903, 904–05 (2013); see also David A. 
Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 
1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1380–90 (2004); DeParle & Gebeloff, supra note 221. 
253. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011 
(2010).  
254. BARTFELD ET AL., INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, SNAP TRENDS AND ANTIPOVERTY 
IMPACTS (2015),  https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/policybriefs/pdfs/PB7-SNAP-Trends- 
Antipoverty-Impacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PA2-TEYJ] (“[I]n 2011, roughly 4 million persons were 
lifted out of poverty and another 3.5 million were lifted out of deep poverty by SNAP benefits.”). 
255. Benjamin D. Sommers & Donald Oellerich, The Poverty Reducing Effect of Medicaid, 32 J. 
HEALTH ECON. 816, 816–17 (2013). 
256. For descriptions of the federal-state funding arrangements in Medicaid, see generally 
MEDICAID AND DEVOLUTION: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (Frank J. Thompson & John J. DiIulio, Jr., 
eds., 1998); Holahan & Pohl, supra note 11; ROSE, supra note 11. 
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and without interference.257 
Even more centralized than SNAP and UI, which are federally-funded 
and designed but administered by the states, the federal EITC is 
administered by the Internal Revenue Service. Some have questioned the 
effectiveness of using the tax code to deliver income support to needy 
families,258 while others have questioned the political incentives for EITC 
expansion.259 Some scholars have pointed out that the EITC does not serve 
the same families as TANF or SNAP because it requires sustained 
participation in the formal economy.260 Nevertheless the EITC’s 
expansion, in the face of TANF’s deterioration suggests the value of a 
centrally administered social program.261 Since the most recent recession, 
some states, like North Carolina and Michigan, have rolled back or 
eliminated their state EITC because of budget pressures.262 
B. Our Block-Grant Future? Current Congressional Proposals 
The 115th Congress is currently considering whether to block grant 
Medicaid, SNAP, and other safety net programs. Many public benefits 
experts and advocates fear that the TANF Block Grant could be used as a 
model for a wave of newly-devolved American social policy. 
Engineered by Speaker Paul Ryan, the House Republicans’ policy 
                                                     
257. President Obama rarely mentioned poverty, but some thought he did not need to because the 
economic recovery allowed him to expand safety net programs in the name of stimulus rather than 
poverty alleviation. 
258. See generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1994); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare by Any Other 
Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1261 (2007). 
259. Morgan, supra note 147, at 37 (“The ‘hidden’ nature of tax expenditures may facilitate their 
creation and expansion, but their invisibility does not enable much political credit claiming . . . .”); 
see also SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE 38–47 (2011) (describing how low-salience 
programs, like the EITC and other tax expenditures, are less likely to induce political activism by 
their recipients). 
260. Zatz, supra note 132, at 1179. 
261. See LARRY BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 246–47 (2008); Joshua L. Boehm et al., The 
Earned Income Tax Credit, Low-Income Workers, and the Legal Aid Community, 3 COLUM. J. TAX 
L. 176, 194–202 (2013) (calling for centralized reforms by IRS); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken 
Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and A Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 515, 561–65 (2013) (same). 
262. See Lee Weisbecker, McCrory Signs Bill Eliminating Tax Credit, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (Mar. 13, 
2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/news/2013/03/13/mccrory-signs-bill-
eliminating-tax.html [https://perma.cc/KUF5-W323] (recounting the repeal of North Carolina’s 
EITC); Study: Michigan Among States Raising Poor’s Taxes, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/11/study_michigan_among_states_ra.html 
[https://perma.cc/45P6-THTH] (noting that “Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin all have scaled 
back tax credits for low-income workers in recent years”). 
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agenda for the 2016 election cycle, “A Better Way,” included vague 
promises to consolidate anti-poverty programs into a single grant to 
states.263 In the past, Speaker Ryan as Chairman of the House Committee 
on Ways and Means and as Chairman of the House Budget Committee 
has proposed Medicaid block grants.264 President Trump is also on the 
record supporting block grants for Medicaid.265 
As for SNAP, Speaker Ryan’s “Better Way” Agenda did not propose 
block granting the program, but the Fiscal Year 2016 House Budget 
Resolution did.266 Tom Price, who chaired the House Budget Committee 
at the time, served as President Trump’s first Health and Human Services 
Secretary.267 When Speaker Ryan chaired the Budget Committee, he 
proposed merging SNAP with ten other low-income programs into one 
“Opportunity Grant” that would give states a block grant for all eleven 
programs.268 Similarly, in the 114th Congress, the chair of the House 
Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Elementary, and Secondary 
Education introduced legislation that would create block grants for 
nutrition programs in three states.269 
                                                     
263. TASK FORCE ON POVERTY, OPPORTUNITY, AND UPWARD MOBILITY, A BETTER WAY: OUR 
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MEDICAID BY MORE THAN ONE-QUARTER BY 2024 AND MORE AFTER THAT (2014), 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/ryan-block-grant-proposal-would-cut-medicaid-by-more-than-one-
quarter-by-2024-and-more [https://perma.cc/XR9D-2UAW].  
265. See Health Care, TRUMP PENCE, https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/health-care/ 
[https://perma.cc/ 2B45-VYSG] (supporting an effort to “[m]aximize flexibility for states via block 
grants”). 
266. See generally H. BUDGET COMM., 114TH CONG., FY2016 BUDGET RESOLUTION: A 
BALANCED BUDGET FOR A STRONGER AMERICA 29 (Comm. Print 2015), 
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy16budget.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ANY-QXAC] (proposing 
to convert SNAP to a “State Flexibility Fund”). 
267. Remarks by the Vice President at a Swearing-in Ceremony for Secretary Price, WHITE HOUSE 
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/remarks-vice-president-
swearing-ceremony-secretary-price [https://perma.cc/J867-4LLZ]. 
268. See generally PAUL RYAN, H.R. BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY 
IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE (Comm. Print 2014), 
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N4 
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The House Budget for fiscal year 2018 proposed $150 billion in cuts to 
SNAP by imposing not just direct cuts to the program, but also by 
transferring “significant authority” over SNAP to the states over the 
following decade.270 Most think-tanks and analysts have read that 
proposal to mean something similar to block grants.271 Similarly, the 
House Budget calls for block granting Medicaid.272 Indeed, in the most 
recent legislation to repeal the Affordable Care Act, Graham-Cassidy, 
Senator Graham defended the Medicaid block grant proposal by 
referencing TANF: “[i]n 1996, we block granted money for welfare 
reform, and it worked like a charm.”273  
If Congress passes and the President signs something along the lines of 
the House budget or Graham-Cassidy, states would be faced with a fixed 
sum to run their Medicaid and SNAP programs. States would only have 
two options during the next recession: 1) reduce the number of recipients 
or 2) reduce the services or benefits to the recipients. Of course, states can 
choose to divert funding from other programs or raise revenue, but states 
have no mechanism to receive further funding from the federal 
government. As a result, a Medicaid or SNAP block grant program will 
fail to properly function during times of increasing need. 
Furthermore, without inflationary controls or additional appropriations 
from Congress, block grants to SNAP and Medicaid would lose value over 
time. TANF’s block grant has “eroded substantially due to inflation and 
is worth 33 percent less than it was 20 years ago.”274 Even if there are no 
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economic downturns or inflation, the sheer growth of the population will 
mean that programs funded through block grants will face fewer dollars 
per recipient over time. Like TANF, block grants to Medicaid or SNAP 
would not only freeze the amount of funding (and therefore the amount of 
relief), but would also aggravate unequal expenditures among 
states.275 And as TANF’s legacy demonstrates, block grants give states 
excessive flexibility to use block grant funds for other purposes. Block 
grant programs typically have few reporting or accountability 
provisions.276 
Of course, one could imagine improvements on the block grant formula 
so as to mitigate the risk that Medicaid and SNAP go the way of TANF. 
TANF lacks three features of a more responsible block grant regime that 
Medicaid and SNAP proposals could include. First, the federal 
government should set and enforce basic minima below which no state 
can go.277 With TANF, the federal government set an initial amount of 
funding in the block grant formula that has not been increased or adjusted 
for inflation. Current block grant proposals for Medicaid and SNAP could 
include provisions that adjust the block grant for inflation or require 
annual increases. 
A second feature which would lessen the damage of block grants is to 
supplement funding in states that have historically underfunded safety net 
programs. With TANF, the federal government stopped increasing 
supplemental grants in 2001 and did away with these equalizing measures 
altogether in 2011.278 However, future Congressional proposals could 
include supplemental grants for Medicaid and SNAP. 
The third feature would be to require “systematic benchmarking and 
evaluation of state experiments and national promotion of results.”279 The 
federal government does not conduct, nor does it require the states to 
conduct, systematic research on the effects of changes to TANF. In fact, 
the federal government does not even require the states to report how 
many TANF families each state is serving through non-cash programs and 
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278. PAVETTI ET AL., supra note 139. 
279. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 13, at 206. 
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benefits.280 Current Congressional proposals could require far more 
extensive reporting on how states are using block grant funds. However, 
there is no indication that the proposed House budget makes any of these 
improvements on the design flaws of the TANF Block Grant, with the 
possible exception of a per capita cap in Medicaid. 
Even still, while these potential improvements on the TANF Block 
Grant would mitigate some of the most damaging features of block grants, 
they would most likely be overwhelmed by the strong incentives in states 
to ration services in the face of these fixed federal appropriations. The 
legacy of TANF should dampen expectations that transforming Medicaid 
or SNAP into block grant programs would lead to anything other than 
programmatic deterioration. 
CONCLUSION 
TANF’s twenty-year legacy is a cautionary tale for two audiences: 
academics who embrace devolution of funding decisions and program 
design to states and anti-poverty advocates who seek to strengthen the 
safety net. Programs like SNAP and the EITC, not TANF, should serve as 
the models for future funding schemes proposed by anti-poverty 
advocates. 
Lawyers tend to focus more on statutes and regulations and less on the 
implementation of the same. They see policies instead of programs—
categorical eligibility rather than actual receipt. As a result, progressive 
advocates of devolution focus on statutory regimes as the evidence of 
federalism’s benefits at the expense of the outcomes of that devolution. 
This theory of federalism tends to emphasize regulatory regimes 
governing private action over distributive schemes that disburse public 
funds. For instance, gay marriage is a right that a state can make available 
with relative programmatic ease. TANF is not so easily provided. State 
action is more diffuse, obscure, and complicated when it comes to public 
benefits. In the morass of state finances, researchers miss the structural 
deficiencies that characterize state-led social policy. 
Scholars are right to point to state innovation in areas of civil rights and 
environmental law, but they miss the dark side of devolution. States are 
capable of innovation in certain areas of policy and law, but are incapable 
of systematic reform in others. Put another way, proponents of a 
progressive federalism often rely on examples in which states improve 
                                                     
280. FALK, supra note 201, at 7 (“Federal TANF reporting requirements focus on families receiving 
only ongoing cash assistance, with no complete reporting on families receiving other TANF benefits 
and services.”). 
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upon or surpass national efforts in extending rights and regulations 
(federalism’s floors) at the expense of examples in which states struggle 
to distribute resources (federalism’s ceilings).281 Those who are tempted 
to devolve authority to states should recognize the implications of their 
focus on floors upon which states can build rather than ceilings which 
hamper states’ redistributive efforts. It is not an accident that the areas 
scholars identify as models of progressive federalism are ones that do not 
necessarily involve distributive programs or fiscal federalism: areas like 
environmental policy, education standards, and gay rights. 
By giving states a remarkable degree of discretion in how they design, 
administer, and fund cash assistance for needy families, the federal 
government has permitted states to use those funds for unrelated 
programs, restrict eligibility, and fail to report how the program or its 
recipients have fared. What’s more, by freezing the block grant at a 
funding level that is twenty years past and by repealing the supplemental 
funding that supported states with historically low levels of funding, the 
federal government has retreated from its initial commitment to create a 
national minimum for state effort in this area of social policy. 
Even when the federal government wanted to use TANF as part of the 
largest economic stimulus package ever passed by Congress, it could not 
simply increase benefit levels or loosen eligibility requirements. Instead, 
the federal government had to rely on other programs, create a separate 
emergency fund, and recruit states to apply for waivers to set up more 
generous programs—a call to which no state responded. The devolution 
and fiscal federalism of TANF has weakened our national capacity to set 
safeguards and design supports for poor families—a segment of our 
society that is challenging to organize at any level of government. The 
experience of TANF and its block grant funding mechanism is a 
cautionary tale to any advocate who seeks to devolve further 
responsibility to state governments and to scholars who believe federalist 
reforms can improve distributive programs. 
                                                     
281. I am indebted to David Super who sketched out distinctions between regulatory and fiscal 
federalism in Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005). 
